Epistemic Dependence

Abstract

ABSTRACT. The goal of this paper is to explore and defend the epistemic dependence of knowledge⎯roughly, the dependence of one's knowledge on factors outwith one's cognitive agency⎯and to situate this thesis within a wider framework for thinking about knowledge, one on which knowledge demands both cognitive agency and extra-agential factors. It is argued that the epistemic dependence thesis comes in both positive (knowledge-enabling) and negative (knowledge-precluding) forms, and that properly understood it runs contrary to a number of central movements in contemporary epistemology. Despite appearances, the question of whether one's epistemology allows for epistemic dependence runs orthogonal to the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction. Instead, it reflects a rather different dispute between epistemic individualism and epistemic anti-individualism. A narrow form of epistemic individualism is contrasted with a broader form that allows for extended cognitive processes. While our initial focus is on perceptual knowledge specifically, it is also shown that with this framework in place, the prospects for a distinctively social epistemic anti-individualism are very sound. Furthermore, it is claimed that this result is not specific to a particular social kind of knowledge, but rather reflects a point about knowledge in general. This is brought out by considering epistemic twin earth arguments that demonstrate the general epistemic dependence of knowledge. Social epistemic anti-individualism is thus motivated on more general antiindividualist grounds, reflecting the wider reach of the epistemic dependence thesis. The rationale for this thesis within a broader approach to knowledge that allows for both agential and extra-agential factors to play a role⎯what I call anti-luck virtue epistemology⎯is then explored.

A taxonomy of types of epistemic dependence: introduction to the Synthese special issue on epistemic dependence

“…11 The normative implications of this will become clearer in §5. 12 See Pritchard (2015) for this sort of characterization of the notion of epistemic dependence. 13 Similar considerations can be given for negative epistemic dependence.…”

“…SeePritchard (2015) for further discussion on the distinction between positive and negative epistemic dependence. 4 SeeKornblith (1980),Audi (1983) and more recentlyOakley (2006) for discussion of the notion of epistemic dependence in the context of foundationalism.…”

Citizenry incompetence and the epistemic structure of society

“…But taking this dependence seriously is not just a matter of recognizing our testimonial dependence, but also the more complex pra ices of interdependence found in our di ision of e iste ic and cogniti e labou that aren't reduci le to transmitting knowledge or some other epistemic good. 10 It's a mistake to take information sharing as exhausting the forms of epistemic dependence to which our beliefs are subjected (Gol berg, 2011;Pritchard, 2015;Townley, 2011). In fact, in epistemic communities, members not only share information but also act as exemplars, co-operators and trainers, among other things.…”

Knowledge as a social kind

“…Carter and Palermos, 2015;Pritchard, 2015). So, as social and feminist epistemologists have for some time noticed (e.g.…”

“…It is a mistake to take information sharing as exhausting the forms of epistemic dependence to which our beliefs are subjected (e.g. Gol berg, 2011;Pritchard, 2015;Townley, 2011). In fact, in epistemic communities, members not only share information, but also act as exemplars, co-operators and trainers, among other things.…”