Second-party and third-party punishment in a public goods experiment

Zhou, Yan; Jiao, Peiran; Zhang, Qilin

doi:10.1080/13504851.2016.1161709

Cited by 20 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Third, the decisions children made in our study were third-party, judging whether punishment or partner choice should occur in a situation not involving the child. Past work has shown important differences in second-and third-party punishment decisions (FeldmanHall, Sokol-Hessner, Van Bavel, & Phelps, 2014;Gummerum & Chu, 2014;Raihani & Bshary, 2015;Zhou, Jiao, & Zhang, 2016) and future work should explore the degree to which second-and third-party partner choice decisions are made similarly.…”

Section: Limitations and Future Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An earlier role for intent in children’s partner choice versus punishment

Martin¹,

Leddy²,

Young³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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When making a moral judgment, we typically care about two factors: whether the person caused a bad outcome and whether they intended for it to happen. Notably, the weight accorded to these factors in adulthood varies by the type of judgment being made. For punishment decisions, intentions and outcomes carry relatively equal weight; for partner choice decisions (i.e., deciding whether or not to interact with someone again), intentions are weighted much more heavily. These behavioral differences in punishment and partner choice judgments may also reflect more fundamental differences in the cognitive processes supporting these decisions. Exploring how punishment and partner choice emerge in development provides important and unique insight into these processes as they emerge and mature. Here, we explore the developmental emergence of punishment and partner choice decisions in 4- to 9-year-old children. Given the importance of intentions for partner choice decisions¬–from both theoretical and empirical perspectives–we targeted the sensitivity of these two responses to others’ intentions as well as outcomes caused. Our punishment results replicate past work: young children are more focused on outcomes caused and become increasingly sensitive to intentions with age. In contrast, partner choice judgments exhibit sensitivity to intentions at an earlier age than punishment judgments, manifesting as earlier condemnation in cases of attempted violations. These results reveal distinct developmental trajectories for punishment and partner choice judgments, with implications for our understanding of the processes underlying these two responses as well as the development of moral judgment more broadly.

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Section: Limitations and Future Directionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An earlier role for intent in children’s partner choice versus punishment

Martin¹,

Leddy²,

Young³

et al. 2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This gain might be more appealing to men according to the stronger association they face between reproductive success and status 67 . In contrast, second-party punishment does not award any of these advantages 66,68 . Further analyses on the motivation to engage in 3PP in men and women controlling for the tendency to display care-oriented, normative, and status-seeking behaviors could help to clarify the sexual differences in the association between 3PP and cooperation and, consequently, on cooperative behavior within groups 32 .…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…This differential way of evaluating third-parties could be driving the sex differences in 3PP described in the literature 15,29,30 , a feature we also observe in our sample even after controlling for sexually dimorphic characteristics. It is interesting to point out that 3PP, in addition to promoting an increase in general prosociality 66 , confers a gain in status and trustworthiness to the individual who performs it 8,10 . This gain might be more appealing to men according to the stronger association they face between reproductive success and status 67 .…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sex Affects the Relationship Between Third Party Punishment and Cooperation

Rodríguez-Ruiz

Muñoz-Reyes

Iglesias-Julios

et al. 2019

Sci Rep

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Prosocial third-party punishment (3PP) is a punitive behavior against antisocial individuals, which might explain extended cooperativeness in humans. 3PP shows sexual dimorphism, being more frequent in men than in women. We studied whether sexually dimorphic features related to sexual hormones during development (facial dimorphism and 2D:4D) influence the tendency to engage in 3PP in a sample of 511 women and 328 men. After playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma, participants had to decide whether to penalize the defection of a third player who had exploited his/her counterpart’s cooperation. In line with previous studies, we observe that men are more prone to engage in 3PP than women. We find that this sex difference is due to cooperative men being more likely to punish than cooperative women. In addition, men with higher facial masculinity are less likely to engage in 3PP, whereas no features influence 3PP in women. We discuss the possibility that sex differences in the motivations and fitness implications underlying 3PP might be driving the observed results.

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“…Hence, if we want to achieve collective rationality by individual choice and obtain the benefits of cooperation, then we must motivate and induce individual behaviours. The examples are punishing uncooperative behaviours 29,35–39 or rewarding cooperative behaviours 33,40–43 . However, in reality, punishments and rewards are costly, the process of which is essentially a second-order social dilemma 44–46 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games

Quan

Zheng

Wang

et al. 2019

Sci Rep

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Mechanisms and conditions for the spontaneous emergence of cooperation in multi-player social dilemma games remain an open question. This paper focuses on stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games with different exclusion strategies. We introduce four strategy types in the population, namely, cooperation, defection, loner and exclusion. Synchronous and asynchronous exclusion forms have been compared in finite-sized, well-mixed and structured populations. In addition, we verify that the asynchronous exclusion mechanism is indeed better than the synchronous exclusion mechanism in all cases. The benefits of the asynchronous exclusion are measured by comparing the probability that the system chooses the cooperative states in the two situations. In the well-mixed population cases, only when the investment amplification factor is small and the probability of exclusion success is high will the asynchronous exclusion mechanism have a relatively large advantage in promoting cooperation. However, in the structured population cases, the range of the investment amplification factor, in which the asynchronous exclusion mechanism has relatively large advantages in promoting cooperation, is somewhat different and is mainly in the middle of the interval under our parameters. Our study further corroborated that when non-participation and exclusion strategies exist, a structured population does not necessarily promote cooperation compared with a well-mixed population for some parameter combinations. Thus, we acquire a good understanding of the emergence of cooperation under different exclusion mechanisms.

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Second-party and third-party punishment in a public goods experiment

Cited by 20 publications

References 11 publications

An earlier role for intent in children’s partner choice versus punishment

An earlier role for intent in children’s partner choice versus punishment

Sex Affects the Relationship Between Third Party Punishment and Cooperation

Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games

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