An earlier role for intent in children’s partner choice versus punishment

Abstract

When making a moral judgment, we typically care about two factors: whether the person caused a bad outcome and whether they intended for it to happen. Notably, the weight accorded to these factors in adulthood varies by the type of judgment being made. For punishment decisions, intentions and outcomes carry relatively equal weight; for partner choice decisions (i.e., deciding whether or not to interact with someone again), intentions are weighted much more heavily. These behavioral differences in punishment and partner choice judgments may also reflect more fundamental differences in the cognitive processes supporting these decisions. Exploring how punishment and partner choice emerge in development provides important and unique insight into these processes as they emerge and mature. Here, we explore the developmental emergence of punishment and partner choice decisions in 4- to 9-year-old children. Given the importance of intentions for partner choice decisions¬–from both theoretical and empirical perspectives–we targeted the sensitivity of these two responses to others’ intentions as well as outcomes caused. Our punishment results replicate past work: young children are more focused on outcomes caused and become increasingly sensitive to intentions with age. In contrast, partner choice judgments exhibit sensitivity to intentions at an earlier age than punishment judgments, manifesting as earlier condemnation in cases of attempted violations. These results reveal distinct developmental trajectories for punishment and partner choice judgments, with implications for our understanding of the processes underlying these two responses as well as the development of moral judgment more broadly.

Human Morality Is Based on an Early-Emerging Moral Core

“…Third, whereas verbal tasks for young children focus on action acceptability, naughtiness, and punishment, nonverbal tasks for infants examine whom participants would rather engage with (e.g., via reaching or looking). Recent studies suggest that young children are more sensitive to others' intentions when tasks are framed around social engagement (e.g., whom to invite to a party, who is nicer; Martin et al 2021;Van de Vondervoort & Hamlin 2018). Taken together, these accounts suggest that there is continuity in intention-based evaluations between infancy and early childhood.…”

Human morality is based on an early-emerging moral core

“…Tasks about the acceptability of actions, naughtiness, and punishment, by contrast, do not ask young children to associate with a given agent. Recent research finds that young children may be sensitive to others' intentions at an earlier age when tasks are framed around partner choice (e.g., whom to invite to a party, who is nicer; Martin et al 2021;Van de Vondervoort & Hamlin 2018). Thus, although there may appear to be a discrepancy between findings from infants and young children, there is now EARLY-EMERGING EVALUATIONS growing evidence that this discrepancy is explainable, that there is continuity in intention-based evaluations.…”

Are some cultures more mind-minded in their moral judgements than others?

“…By contrast, if theory of mind is relatively effortless to deploy, then even relatively small or infrequent benefits would be enough to sustain people's probability of using it. Second, the function of theory of mind: some theorists have suggested that considering an individual's mental states is most useful when choosing interaction partners, versus when interacting with existing partners [25,26]. If you can never switch jobs, it might feel pointless to evaluate the leadership style of your current boss.…”

“…The role of intentions may also depend on the relational distance between the person who caused harm, and the observing judge. Some theorists have suggested that observers should care about a person's intentions when those intentions are diagnostic of the person's future behaviour [26], and when the observer can choose whether or not to interact with that person in the future [25]. If a person cannot control the harm they cause, then their intentions are irrelevant for their future value in relationships [26,37].…”