Resources and alternatives in coalition formation: The effects on payoff, self‐serving behaviour, and bargaining length

Beest, Ilja van; Dijk, Eric van; Wilke, Henk

doi:10.1002/ejsp.226

Cited by 21 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…The format of the coalition game was based on the landowner paradigm (Van Beest et al 2003, 2004b. In the current version we told participants that they owned one parcel of land with an assessed value of 20,000 euros.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several theories have been proposed, some stressing power differences, others stressing differences in resources, but all assuming that people use these differences to maximize their own payoff (Van Beest, Van Dijk, & Wilke, 2004b). In line with this theorizing one of the most replicated fi ndings of coalition research is that parties would rather share payoffs with few others in a small coalition than with many others in a large coalition (e.g.…”

Section: Previous Coalition Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Implicit and Explicit Attitudes and Interracial Interaction: The Moderating Role of Situationally Available Control Resources

Hofmann

Gschwendner

Castelli

et al. 2008

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations

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The present research examined whether implicit and explicit racial attitudes predict interracial interaction behavior differently as a function of situationally available control resources. Specifically, we investigated how implicit attitudes (Implicit Association Test) and explicit attitudes (Blatant/Subtle prejudice) were related to interracial interaction behaviors of Italians toward an African interviewer (Study 1) and of Germans toward a Turkish interviewer (Study 2). For half of the interview questions, participants' control resources were reduced via a memory task. Across both studies, the Race IAT was more predictive of behavior when participants were taxed than when untaxed. Conversely, explicit attitudes were somewhat more predictive under full resources. Taken together, our findings suggest that available control resources moderate the predictive validity of implicit and explicit attitudes.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Previous Coalition Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implicit and Explicit Attitudes and Interracial Interaction: The Moderating Role of Situationally Available Control Resources

Hofmann

Gschwendner

Castelli

et al. 2008

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…A robust Wnding in coalition research is that people rather share payoVs with few others in small coalitions than with many others in large coalitions (e.g., Gamson, 1961Gamson, , 1964Komorita, 1974;Komorita & Meek, 1978;Michener, Fleishman, Vaske, & Statza, 1975;Murnighan, 1978b;Van Beest, Van Dijk, & Wilke, 2004a, 2004bVan Beest, Wilke, & Van Dijk, 2003;Willis, 1962). For example, three people negotiating about 60 euros are more likely to form two-person coalitions in which both members obtain 30 euros than three-person coalitions in which each member obtains 20 euros.…”

Section: Coalition Formation and Payov Valencementioning

confidence: 99%

Do-no-harm in coalition formation: Why losses inhibit exclusion and promote fairness cognitions

Beest¹,

Dijk²,

Dreu³

et al. 2005

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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“…The instructions then described the logistics of their negotiation (Komorita & Meek, 1978;Van Beest, Van Dijk, & Wilke, 2004). Negotiations took place in rounds and continued until a coalition was formed.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Honesty pays: On the benefits of having and disclosing information in coalition bargaining

Beest

Steinel

Murnighan

2011

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

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People typically think of negotiations as competitive, which often leads them to engage in secrecy and even deception. In three experiments we show that this approach can backfire in coalition bargaining. Results show that, even though bargainers with an outcome advantage only obtain favorable outcomes when this information is public, they rarely choose to reveal this information. Fairness motivations fueled decisions to reveal this information and make attractive offers whereas self-interest fueled decisions not to reveal and make unattractive offers. Finally, perspective taking increased proselfs' inclinations to keep their advantage private whereas it increased prosocials' inclinations to reveal. These findings suggest that many people are not naturally inclined to reveal private information when they have an outcome advantage, but that fairness motives encourage revelation and, ironically, increase revealers' outcomes in coalition bargaining. Thus, in this context, honesty pays.In many negotiations, bargainers have private information: what one party knows, the others don't, and the distribution of information can seriously affect both the bargaining process and its outcomes (De Dreu, Beersma, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2007). Information about who gets what when a specific deal is closed may be common knowledge, but often is only known to the specific individuals who benefit. Typical car buyers, for instance, are aware of their own outcomes and whether they have paid more or less than they wanted. Almost never, however, do they discover the sellers' or the car manufacturers' profits from their transaction. In the current research we investigate the effects of having and revealing private information about the payoffs in multiparty negotiations. We show that the popular belief that people should guard their private information and use it to maximize their own outcomes can backfire in this context. Thus, unlike the general stereotype that depicts negotiations as competitive, strategic, and stealthy, we identify competitive interactions in which honesty pays. Information and bargainingBargainers who have private information must decide how to use this information. In particular, they must choose whether they will share their private information truthfully. Although revealing private information may help to create positive outcomes because it helps negotiators to discover creative outcomes that maximize their joint benefit, in more competitive interactions or purely distributive negotiations, revealing information risks non-reciprocity and exploitation. These dynamics are embodied in the "information dilemma" (Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, & Pillutla, 1999): revealing information facilitates the achievement of joint outcomes but simultaneously increases personal vulnerability.Economic theories generally assume that bargainers aim to maximize their individual outcomes and that they will use their private information self-interestedly. Kagel, Kim, and Moser (1996), for example, studied the impact of private information...

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Resources and alternatives in coalition formation: The effects on payoff, self‐serving behaviour, and bargaining length

Cited by 21 publications

References 38 publications

Implicit and Explicit Attitudes and Interracial Interaction: The Moderating Role of Situationally Available Control Resources

Implicit and Explicit Attitudes and Interracial Interaction: The Moderating Role of Situationally Available Control Resources

Do-no-harm in coalition formation: Why losses inhibit exclusion and promote fairness cognitions

Honesty pays: On the benefits of having and disclosing information in coalition bargaining

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