Theoretically, low correlations between implicit and explicit measures can be due to (a) motivational biases in explicit self reports, (b) lack of introspective access to implicitly assessed representations, (c) factors influencing the retrieval of information from memory, (d) method-related characteristics of the two measures, or (e) complete independence of the underlying constructs. The present study addressed these questions from a meta-analytic perspective, investigating the correlation between the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and explicit self-report measures. Based on a sample of 126 studies, the mean effect size was .24, with approximately half of the variability across correlations attributable to moderator variables. Correlations systematically increased as a function of (a) increasing spontaneity of self-reports and (b) increasing conceptual correspondence between measures. These results suggest that implicit and explicit measures are generally related but that higher order inferences and lack of conceptual correspondence can reduce the influence of automatic associations on explicit self-reports.

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Though human beings embody a unique ability for planned behavior, they also often act impulsively. This insight may be important for the study of self-control situations in which people are torn between their long-term goals to restrain behavior and their immediate impulses that promise hedonic fulfillment. In the present article, we outline a dual-systems perspective of impulse and self-control and suggest a framework for the prediction of self-control outcomes. This framework combines three elements that, considered jointly, may enable a more precise prediction of self-control outcomes than they do when studied in isolation: impulsive precursors of behavior, reflective precursors, and situational or dispositional boundary conditions. The theoretical and practical utility of such an approach is demonstrated by drawing on recent evidence from several domains of self-control such as eating, drinking, and sexual behavior.

Previous research has shown that major life events can have short- and long-term effects on subjective well-being (SWB). The present meta-analysis examines (a) whether life events have different effects on cognitive and affective well-being and (b) how the rate of adaptation varies across different life events. Longitudinal data from 188 publications (313 samples, N = 65,911) were integrated to describe the reaction and adaptation to four family events (marriage, divorce, bereavement, child birth) and four work events (unemployment, reemployment, retirement, relocation/migration). The findings show that life events have very different effects on affective and cognitive well-being, and that for most events the effects of life events on cognitive well-being are stronger and more consistent across samples. Different life events differ in their effects on SWB, but these effects are not a function of the alleged desirability of events. The results are discussed with respect to their theoretical implications, and recommendations for future studies on adaptation are given.

This article presents a meta-analysis of research on evaluative conditioning (EC), defined as a change in the liking of a stimulus (conditioned stimulus; CS) that results from pairing that stimulus with other positive or negative stimuli (unconditioned stimulus; US). Across a total of 214 studies included in the main sample, the mean EC effect was d ϭ .52, with a 95% confidence interval of .466 -.582. As estimated from a random-effects model, about 70% of the variance in effect sizes were attributable to true systematic variation rather than sampling error. Moderator analyses were conducted to partially explain this variation, both as a function of concrete aspects of the procedural implementation and as a function of the abstract aspects of the relation between CS and US. Among a range of other findings, EC effects were stronger for high than for low contingency awareness, for supraliminal than for subliminal US presentation, for postacquisition than for postextinction effects, and for self-report than for implicit measures. These findings are discussed with regard to the procedural boundary conditions of EC and theoretical accounts about the mental processes underlying EC.Keywords: evaluative conditioning, affective learning, attitude learning, associative learning, propositional learning One of the most influential ideas in psychology is that human behavior is, to a large extent, governed by likes and dislikes (Allport, 1935;Martin & Levey, 1978). For instance, people prefer the company of people they like and try to avoid those they do not like; people buy and consume products they like rather than those they dislike; and they vote for and support politicians and ideas that they find sympathetic rather than repelling. Furthermore, preferences influence attention, memory, and judgments and form the basis of our emotional life (Fox, 2009). Given the pervasive impact of preferences on behavior, it is vital for our discipline to understand how preferences are formed and how they can be influenced. Although some likes and dislikes may be genetically determined (Poulton & Menzies, 2002), the vast majority of our preferences are learned rather than innate (Rozin & Millman, 1987). But precisely how humans acquire their likes and dislikes continues to be the subject of vigorous debate (Rozin, 1982;De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001).The present article provides a meta-analysis of research on one possible manner in which likes and dislikes can be learned: evaluative conditioning (EC), which may be best defined as an effect that is attributed to a particular core procedure. Specifically, EC refers to a change in the valence of a stimulus (the effect) that is due to the pairing of that stimulus with another positive or negative stimulus (the procedure) (De Houwer, 2007a;De Houwer et al., 2001). The first stimulus is often referred to as the conditioned stimulus (CS), and the second stimulus is often referred to as the unconditioned stimulus (US). Typically, a CS becomes more positive when it has been paired with a posit...

How often and how strongly do people experience desires, to what extent do their desires conflict with other goals, and how often and successfully do people exercise self-control to resist their desires? To investigate desire and attempts to control desire in everyday life, we conducted a large-scale experience sampling study based on a conceptual framework integrating desire strength, conflict, resistance (use of self-control), and behavior enactment. A sample of 205 adults wore beepers for a week. They furnished 7,827 reports of desire episodes and completed personality measures of behavioral inhibition system/behavior activation system (BIS/BAS) sensitivity, trait self-control, perfectionism, and narcissistic entitlement. Results suggest that desires are frequent, variable in intensity, and largely unproblematic. Those urges that do conflict with other goals tend to elicit resistance, with uneven success. Desire strength, conflict, resistance, and self-regulatory success were moderated in multiple ways by personality variables as well as by situational and interpersonal factors such as alcohol consumption, the mere presence of others, and the presence of others who already had enacted the desire in question. Whereas personality generally had a stronger impact on the dimensions of desire that emerged early in its course (desire strength and conflict), situational factors showed relatively more influence on components later in the process (resistance and behavior enactment). In total, these findings offer a novel and detailed perspective on the nature of everyday desires and associated self-regulatory successes and failures.

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As the science of self-control matures, the organization and integration of its key concepts becomes increasingly important. In response, we identified seven major components or "nodes" in current theories and research bearing on self-control: desire, higher order goal, desire-goal conflict, control motivation, control capacity, control effort, and enactment constraints. To unify these diverse and interdisciplinary areas of research, we formulated the interplay of these components in an integrative model of self-control. In this model, desire and an at least partly incompatible higher order goal generate desire-goal conflict, which activates control motivation. Control motivation and control capacity interactively determine potential control effort. The actual control effort invested is determined by several moderators, including desire strength, perceived skill, and competing goals. Actual control effort and desire strength compete to determine a prevailing force, which ultimately determines behavior, provided that enactment constraints do not impede it. The proposed theoretical framework is useful for highlighting several new directions for research on self-control and for classifying self-control failures and self-control interventions.