Reputation-based partner choice is an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity in solving social dilemmas

Sylwester, Karolina; Roberts, Gehan

doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2012.11.009

Cited by 106 publications

(94 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…In fact, demonstrating that individuals have concern for reputation is not the same thing as demonstrating that indirect reciprocity underpins cooperative actions. Instead, rather than investing in costly rewards, bystanders might preferentially select cooperative individuals for interactions and it has been shown that reputation‐based partner choice might be a more efficient mechanism for promoting cooperation than indirect reciprocity (Sylwester and Roberts ) because it does not require the bystander to pay a cost to reward the cooperative partner but instead to make a self‐serving choice to interact with that individual (e.g., Bshary and Grutter ). Importantly, both indirect reciprocity and partner choice based accounts of cooperation predict that individuals invest more when reputation is at stake.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so

Raihani

Bshary

2015

Evolution

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Punishers can benefit from a tough reputation, where future partners cooperate because they fear repercussions. Alternatively, punishers might receive help from bystanders if their act is perceived as just and other-regarding. Third-party punishment of selfish individuals arguably fits these conditions, but it is not known whether third-party punishers are rewarded for their investments. Here, we show that third-party punishers are indeed rewarded by uninvolved bystanders. Third parties were presented with the outcome of a dictator game in which the dictator was either selfish or fair and were allocated to one of three treatments in which they could choose to do nothing or (1) punish the dictator, (2) help the receiver, or (3) choose between punishment and helping, respectively. A fourth player (bystander) then sees the third-party's decision and could choose to reward the third party or not. Third parties that punished selfish dictators were more likely to be rewarded by bystanders than third parties that took no action in response to a selfish dictator. However, helpful third parties were rewarded even more than third-party punishers. These results suggest that punishment could in principle evolve via indirect reciprocity, but also provide insights into why individuals typically prefer to invest in positive actions.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so

Raihani

Bshary

2015

Evolution

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“…Alternatively, these signalling mechanisms may have originated in a partner choice context. Unlike indirect reciprocity, where there is a cost associated with helping 'good' players, choosy players in a partner choice context do not have to incur cost of choosiness [21,41,42]. Accordingly, the signal-reading ability might have first evolved in the partner choice context.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The price of being seen to be just: an intention signalling strategy for indirect reciprocity

2016

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Cooperation among strangers is a marked characteristic of human sociality. One prominent evolutionary explanation for this form of human cooperation is indirect reciprocity, whereby each individual selectively helps people with a 'good' reputation, but not those with a 'bad' reputation. Some evolutionary analyses have underscored the importance of second-order reputation information (the reputation of a current partner's previous partner) for indirect reciprocity as it allows players to discriminate justified 'good' defectors, who selectively deny giving help to 'bad' partners, from unjustified 'bad' defectors. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether people in fact make use of second-order information in indirect reciprocity settings. As an alternative, we propose the intention signalling strategy, whereby defectors are given the option to abandon a resource as a means of expunging their 'bad' reputation. Our model deviates from traditional modelling approaches in the indirect reciprocity literature in a crucial way-we show that first-order information is sufficient to maintain cooperation if players are given an option to signal their intention. Importantly, our model is robust against invasion by both unconditionally cooperative and uncooperative strategies, a first step towards demonstrating its viability as an evolutionarily stable strategy. Furthermore, in two behavioural experiments, when participants were given the option to abandon a resource so as to mend a tarnished reputation, participants not only spontaneously began to use this option, they also interpreted others' use of this option as a signal of cooperative intent.

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“…Cooperation may be used as a signal, which can lead to competition among group members about 'showing off' by exerting altruistic help [178]. Such reputation-based partner choice can increase pay-offs obtained by cooperation above those from indirect reciprocity [179].…”

Section: (C) Indirect Reciprocitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Correlated pay-offs are key to cooperation

Taborsky

Frommen

Riehl

2016

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

122

199

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One contribution of 18 to a theme issue 'The evolution of cooperation based on direct fitness benefits.' Subject Areas: behaviour, evolution, ecology Keywords: cooperation, reciprocity, commodity trading, direct fitness benefits, non-kin, decision rules The general belief that cooperation and altruism in social groups result primarily from kin selection has recently been challenged, not least because results from cooperatively breeding insects and vertebrates have shown that groups may be composed mainly of non-relatives. This allows testing predictions of reciprocity theory without the confounding effect of relatedness. Here, we review complementary and alternative evolutionary mechanisms to kin selection theory and provide empirical examples of cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals in a wide range of taxa. In particular, we focus on the different forms of reciprocity and on their underlying decision rules, asking about evolutionary stability, the conditions selecting for reciprocity and the factors constraining reciprocal cooperation. We find that neither the cognitive requirements of reciprocal cooperation nor the often sequential nature of interactions are insuperable stumbling blocks for the evolution of reciprocity. We argue that simple decision rules such as 'help anyone if helped by someone' should get more attention in future research, because empirical studies show that animals apply such rules, and theoretical models find that they can create stable levels of cooperation under a wide range of conditions. Owing to its simplicity, behaviour based on such a heuristic may in fact be ubiquitous. Finally, we argue that the evolution of exchange and trading of service and commodities among social partners needs greater scientific focus.

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Reputation-based partner choice is an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity in solving social dilemmas

Cited by 106 publications

References 29 publications

Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so

Third-party punishers are rewarded, but third-party helpers even more so

The price of being seen to be just: an intention signalling strategy for indirect reciprocity

Correlated pay-offs are key to cooperation

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