Correlated pay-offs are key to cooperation

Abstract

One contribution of 18 to a theme issue 'The evolution of cooperation based on direct fitness benefits.' Subject Areas: behaviour, evolution, ecology Keywords: cooperation, reciprocity, commodity trading, direct fitness benefits, non-kin, decision rules The general belief that cooperation and altruism in social groups result primarily from kin selection has recently been challenged, not least because results from cooperatively breeding insects and vertebrates have shown that groups may be composed mainly of non-relatives. This allows testing predictions of reciprocity theory without the confounding effect of relatedness. Here, we review complementary and alternative evolutionary mechanisms to kin selection theory and provide empirical examples of cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals in a wide range of taxa. In particular, we focus on the different forms of reciprocity and on their underlying decision rules, asking about evolutionary stability, the conditions selecting for reciprocity and the factors constraining reciprocal cooperation. We find that neither the cognitive requirements of reciprocal cooperation nor the often sequential nature of interactions are insuperable stumbling blocks for the evolution of reciprocity. We argue that simple decision rules such as 'help anyone if helped by someone' should get more attention in future research, because empirical studies show that animals apply such rules, and theoretical models find that they can create stable levels of cooperation under a wide range of conditions. Owing to its simplicity, behaviour based on such a heuristic may in fact be ubiquitous. Finally, we argue that the evolution of exchange and trading of service and commodities among social partners needs greater scientific focus.

Coevolution between positive reciprocity, punishment, and partner switching in repeated interactions

“…According to current evidence, there are very few examples for punishment [15], while there are various examples for positive reciprocity [11]. Regarding partner switching, we are aware only of clear interspecific examples where partner switching in response to defection occurs.…”

“…An often-studied strategy using positive reciprocity as a partner control mechanism is tit-for-tat (TFT), which starts by cooperating and then in subsequent rounds implements the previous action of the partner [3 -5]. Although positive reciprocity is often favoured by selection in evolutionary models [3,[6][7][8], its relevance outside humans has been questioned ( [9], but see [10,11]). …”

First field evidence for alloparental egg care in cooperatively breeding fish

“…Helping duties in cooperative breeders are highly variable between species, including vigilance behaviour and food provisioning in birds and mammals (Clutton‐Brock, ) and egg cleaning and fanning, shelter digging, and antipredator defence in fishes (Taborsky, ). Some of these behaviours, like food provisioning and care of foreign eggs or young, can be called altruistic, as they involve immediate fitness costs to the alloparent without immediate fitness benefits (as defined by Taborsky, Frommen, & Riehl, ). Other behaviours, such as antipredator defence and territory maintenance (e.g., shelter digging) might additionally have an immediately self‐serving component, especially when they are also shown in the absence of dependent young (Brouwer, Heg, & Taborsky, ).…”

The concepts of asymmetric and symmetric power can help resolve the puzzle of altruistic and cooperative behaviour

“…For example, the assistance that male olive baboons ( Papio anubis ) give each other to steal mates from rival males has been interpreted as direct reciprocity (Packer, ) and yet a simpler explanation might be that they gain immediate benefits from synchronizing their attacks (Clutton‐Brock, ). Many have concluded that there is a lack of evidence for reciprocity in non‐human species (Clements & Stephens, ; Dugatkin, ; Stevens & Hauser, ; Clutton‐Brock, ; West et al, ; although see Table 1 in Taborsky, Frommen & Riehl, ) and that mechanisms other than reciprocity are used to enforce cooperation in nature (West et al, ) including coercion (Clutton‐Brock & Parker, ; Clutton‐Brock, ) and partner choice and consent in ‘biological markets’ (Noë & Hammerstein, , ). Even in humans, although reciprocity is seen by some as a universal human characteristic (Broude, ; Krebs, ), others have failed to find evidence for it in exchanges within hunter–gatherer societies (Hawkes, ; Hawkes & Bliege Bird, ; although see Jaeggi & Gurven, ).…”