The price of being seen to be just: an intention signalling strategy for indirect reciprocity

Abstract

Cooperation among strangers is a marked characteristic of human sociality. One prominent evolutionary explanation for this form of human cooperation is indirect reciprocity, whereby each individual selectively helps people with a 'good' reputation, but not those with a 'bad' reputation. Some evolutionary analyses have underscored the importance of second-order reputation information (the reputation of a current partner's previous partner) for indirect reciprocity as it allows players to discriminate justified 'good' defectors, who selectively deny giving help to 'bad' partners, from unjustified 'bad' defectors. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether people in fact make use of second-order information in indirect reciprocity settings. As an alternative, we propose the intention signalling strategy, whereby defectors are given the option to abandon a resource as a means of expunging their 'bad' reputation. Our model deviates from traditional modelling approaches in the indirect reciprocity literature in a crucial way-we show that first-order information is sufficient to maintain cooperation if players are given an option to signal their intention. Importantly, our model is robust against invasion by both unconditionally cooperative and uncooperative strategies, a first step towards demonstrating its viability as an evolutionarily stable strategy. Furthermore, in two behavioural experiments, when participants were given the option to abandon a resource so as to mend a tarnished reputation, participants not only spontaneously began to use this option, they also interpreted others' use of this option as a signal of cooperative intent.

Self‐punishment promotes reconciliation with third parties by addressing the symbolic implications of wrongdoing

“…First, self-punishment can redress the status/power balance upset by the transgression, in much the same way as other-inflicted punishment. This reasoning is in line with the characterization of self-punishment as a sign of the transgressor's willingness to comply with social rules (Tanaka et al, 2016;Zhu et al, 2017). Self-punishment may thus be a signal to others that an individual is not a threat to the social ranking order, taking one's rightful place in the hierarchy by degrading oneself (i.e., a submissive cue, as has been theorized about self-criticism; Sloman, Price, Gilbert, & Gardner, 1994;Zuroff, Moskowitz, & Côt e, 1999).…”

“…One could address this limitation by eliciting a transgression and self-punishment experimentally, in either an elaborate confederate-aided set-up, or through a computer game with ostensible players (e.g., an economic game; Tanaka et al, 2016). One could address this limitation by eliciting a transgression and self-punishment experimentally, in either an elaborate confederate-aided set-up, or through a computer game with ostensible players (e.g., an economic game; Tanaka et al, 2016).…”

“…However, self-punishment may not only alleviate emotional distress; self-punishment may also have some interpersonal benefits. Indeed, transgressors believe self-punishment can help repair their tarnished reputation (Zhu et al, 2017), and there is evidence that they can escape punishment from third party observers by punishing themselves (Tanaka, Ohtsuki, & Ohtsubo, 2016). Nelissen (2012) has argued that self-punishment is a communication of remorse targeted at victims that can help mend the relationship damaged by the transgression.…”

“…Self-punishment might help transgressors avoid punishment from others (Tanaka et al, 2016), but does it transform third parties' attitudes toward the transgressor in a deeper sense, granting self-punishers a return to their moral communities? Self-punishment might help transgressors avoid punishment from others (Tanaka et al, 2016), but does it transform third parties' attitudes toward the transgressor in a deeper sense, granting self-punishers a return to their moral communities?…”

Evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity and arbitrary exploration rates

“…Cooperation and reputation have been mathematically linked in models of Indirect Reciprocity (IR)1112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142. IR models comprise individuals who adopt heuristics for decision-making based on reputations.…”