Purposive Politicians Meet the Institutional Congress: A Review Essay

Rieselbach, Leroy N.; Arnold, R. Douglas; Canon, David T.; Gilmour, John B.; Krehbiel, Keith; Strahan, Randall; Strom, Gerald S.

doi:10.2307/440083

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Consequently, a theory of judicial behavior applicable at the state level must incorporate the electoral incentive. Many influential accounts of legislative behavior posit that elections, and not policy, serve as a primary motivation (e.g., Mayhew 1974;Rieselbach 1992), and the role of elections there is obvious and pronounced. In state supreme courts, the role of elections varies.…”

Section: Justices As Rational Actors With Multiple Goalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Placing State Supreme Courts in State Politics

Brace

Hall²,

Langer

2001

State Politics Policy Q.

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This essay places state supreme courts in state politics by tracking some of the major lines of research on these important institutions, documenting the importance of state supreme courts, and illustrating important variations among state supreme courts on a host of factors, including docket composition, the exercise of judicial review, litigant patterns, and turnover rates. Through analyses of original data on separation-of-powers relationships in the abortion controversy, it also provides a brief empirical demonstration of how courts influence and are influenced by the political and policy processes operating in the states, and how comparative research helps resolve fundamental controversies in political science. We conclude that there is a remarkable and unfortunate asymmetry between the political importance of state supreme courts and the attention given to them by the research community. Moreover, by capitalizing on the analytical advantages of comparative state judicial politics scholarship, scholars will be able to solve some of the most complex puzzles in the study of state politics.

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Section: Justices As Rational Actors With Multiple Goalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Placing State Supreme Courts in State Politics

Brace

Hall²,

Langer

2001

State Politics Policy Q.

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“…Weil in der Literatur bisher bloss eine beschränkte Anzahl von empirischen Untersuchungen strategischen Abstimmungsverhaltens in legislativen Entscheidungsprozessen besprochen wird, kann das Problem der generellen Instabilität von Majoritätsabstim-mungen als ein Forschungsbereich bezeichnet werden, "that reflects the imbalance between theory and empirical research" (Green and Shapiro 1994: 113). Dieser Beitrag möchte dem Ruf nach empirischen Fallbeispielen folgen (Krehbiel 1988;Strom 1990;Rieselbach 1992;Green and Shapiro 1994).…”

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Strategisches Abstimmungsverhalten in legislativen Entscheidungsprozessen: Ein Fallbeispiel

Senti¹

1998

Swiss Political Sci Review

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Dass in legislativen Entscheidungsprozessen die Majoritätsregel grundsätzlich instabil ist, gilt als klassisches Resultat der Public-Choice-Theorie. Es sind vielfach die institutionellen Verfahrensregeln, die bei Auftreten zyklischer Mehrheiten letztlich das Resultat bestimmen. Dass politische Akteure unter Ausnutzung der Entscheidungsregeln durch strategisches Abstimmungsverhalten kollektiv unerwünschte Entscheidungen auch bewusst herbeiführen können, ist ebenfalls Gegenstand der theoretischen Literatur. Umstritten ist jedoch die empirische Evidenz des strategischen Abstimmungsverhaltens. Diese Fallstudie beschreibt eine Entscheidung aus dem schweizerischen Ständerat, in welcher eine Akteurgruppe durch strategisches Abstimmungsverhalten ein rational zu erwartendes Entscheidungsresultat verhindern konnte. Der Beitrag liefert eine theoretische Ergänzung der in der Literatur unter der Bezeichnung "Rettungs"-und "Killer-Anträge" beschriebenen manipulativen Festlegung der politischen Agenda: In paarweisen Mehrheitsabstimmungen kann durch Hinzufügen zusätzlicher Lösungsalter-nativen politischen Gegnern auch ungewollt die Möglichkeit eröffnet werden, durch eine strategisch verfälschte Präferenzäusserung ein paradoxes Resultat zu erzielen.

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Responsiveness and Deliberation in Divided Government: Presidential Leadership in Tax Policy Making

Weatherford¹

1994

Brit. J. Polit. Sci

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At the heart of the puzzle of representation is the responsibility to construct policy that both responds to the separatist pull of local constituencies and meets the republican aspiration that government leaders define and promote common interests. The difficulty of balancing responsiveness and deliberation is heightened by divided government, where pursuing a competitive course leads to stalemate, while compromising too readily threatens to undermine party principle. This article argues that politicians have an incentive to accommodate their strategies to divided government, and that this accommodation will take the form of centralizing power in the congressional party leadership, with an increased willingness on the part of the president and the congressional leadership to engage in substantive consultation over the content of the legislative agenda. These accommodations will foster the possibility of meaningful deliberation; whether it will occur on any given issue will depend on the context of information and interpretation. Because most policies are open to multiple interpretations, political leaders have some leeway in framing the issue and thus determining what information and which political resources will shape the strategic context. Beginning with a review of the literature on legislative processes and presidential influence in Congress, and drawing on the formal theory literature on information and uncertainty, I explicate the argument by way of an empirical case study of one of the most historically significant tax policy negotiations in the post-war period.

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Purposive Politicians Meet the Institutional Congress: A Review Essay

Cited by 4 publications

References 2 publications

Placing State Supreme Courts in State Politics

Placing State Supreme Courts in State Politics

Strategisches Abstimmungsverhalten in legislativen Entscheidungsprozessen: Ein Fallbeispiel

Responsiveness and Deliberation in Divided Government: Presidential Leadership in Tax Policy Making

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