Strategisches Abstimmungsverhalten in legislativen Entscheidungsprozessen: Ein Fallbeispiel

Senti, Martin

doi:10.1002/j.1662-6370.1998.tb00236.x

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…We use responses to this survey to generate information on the preferences of MPs. Using surveys to elicit preferences over various amendments and versions of bills leads to an important trade-off, compared with relying on speeches and statements to the media as used by Senti (1998) in his study on another voting process in the Swiss parliament. If the survey is designed and carried out well before voting starts, the exact content of the amendments and versions is difficult or even impossible to anticipate.…”

Section: Strategic Voting In An Agenda Treementioning

confidence: 98%

“…Thus, in the present paper we present evidence for strategic behaviour 2 by MPs relying on a novel strategy. Whereas previous work on strategic behaviour has tried to infer sincere preferences from the roll call vote record (Bjurulf & Niemi, 1978;Calvert & Fenno, 1994;Denzau, Riker, & Shepsle, 1985;Leemann, 2009;Rasch, 2014) or proxies for preferences (Enelow, 1981;Enelow & Koehler, 1980;Senti, 1998), we propose to employ preference measures obtained through a survey of MPs. This allows us to demonstrate with much more accuracy whether MPs behaved strategically and to what extent.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategic Behaviour in Parliament

Bütikofer¹,

Hug²

2015

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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675-689) started to assess how knowledge about the sequence of votes may help us to understand the legislative process in more detail. Many of these analyses are, however, predicated on quite important assumptions regarding the forward-looking capacities of MPs. In this paper, this more recent literature is drawn on and brought to bear on an analysis of two bills adopted in the Swiss parliament. Having detailed information available on MPs' preferences over various options voted upon, it is possible to test whether MPs behave strategically, and to what degree they are capable of anticipating the way forward through the agenda tree. Evidence is found that MPs behave strategically, but their foresight is not as perfect as one would expect from theoretical models.

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Section: Strategic Voting In An Agenda Treementioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Behaviour in Parliament

Bütikofer¹,

Hug²

2015

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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“…22 For real‐world examples of both formats with more than three alternatives, see Ladha (1994, p. 60) and Senti (1998, p. 16). …”

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confidence: 99%

Agendas in legislative decision‐making

Horan

2021

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Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats: the so‐called Euro–Latin and Anglo–American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features—history‐independence and persistence—are common in legislative settings. I then characterize the social choice rules implemented by sophisticated voting on agendas with these two features. I also characterize the rules implemented by more specialized formats (called priority agendas and convex agendas) whose structure is closely related to the prevailing rules for order‐of‐voting used by legislatures. These results establish a clear connection between structure and outcomes for a wide range of legislative agendas.

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The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern

Bochsler

2009

Public Choice

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The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern 'Condorcet cycles' (or 'paradoxes of cyclical majorities') The constructive referendum, by contrast, which will be discussed below, differs in both aspects. It provides us with full information about the collective preference order. And it is reform-friendly: supporting a reform option that wins a greater share of individual preferences than the status quo.The first part of this paper explains the nature of Condorcet cycles, and briefly discusses the relevant empirical literature on the subject. Subsequently, I move to discuss how the Swiss practice of constructive referendums differs from other situations of multi-option decision making, before explaining the Condorcet cycle that occurred in

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Strategisches Abstimmungsverhalten in legislativen Entscheidungsprozessen: Ein Fallbeispiel

Cited by 4 publications

References 20 publications

Strategic Behaviour in Parliament

Strategic Behaviour in Parliament

Agendas in legislative decision‐making

The Marquis de Condorcet goes to Bern

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