Private Value Allocations in Large Economies with Differential Information

Differential information economies: Introduction

“…Moreover, the equilibrium outcome is sensitive to the initial information of an agent (i.e., a change in information can result in a change of the NTU value). Recently, Einy-Shitovitz (2001) have proved a private value equivalence theorem.…”

The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information

“…Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1998) show that the set of (weak) fine core allocations of a Radner type economy with a continuum of traders coincides with set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which each trader has the "joint information" of all the traders in the original economy. Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (1999) establish an analogous result for fine value allocations.…”

The veto mechanism in atomic differential information economies

“…The free disposal condition expressed by (1) is usually required to ensure the existence of competitive allocations supported by non negative prices (see [6]), but on the other hand it does not guarantee the incentive compatibility of equilibria (see [7]). We denote by F (E) the set of all feasible allocations for the economy E. For each t ∈ T , we denote by…”

“…To this end, let T − C A (E) be the set of all feasible allocations which are not privately blocked by a generalized coalition γ, with full support 6 . Formally, an allocation x belongs to T − C A (E) if there do not exist a generalized coalition γ and an allocation y :…”