The bargaining set of a large economy with differential information

Abstract

Summary.We study the Mas-Colell bargaining set of an exchange economy with differential information and a continuum of traders. We established the equivalence of the private bargaining set and the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. As for the weak fine bargaining set, we show that it contains the set of competitive equilibrium allocations of an associated symmetric information economy in which each trader has the "joint information" of all the traders in the original economy, but unlike the weak fine core and the set of fine value allocations, it may also contain allocations which are not competitive in the associated economy.

The Calculation Method of the Completeness of Information Under the Information Asymmetric Circumstance

“…The traditional way to describe the information asymmetry is mainly using the "information set" [7] [8] . , and we also make the index a tool to measure the veracities of these descriptions and put forward its computing method.…”