Differential information economies: Introduction

Allen, Beth; Yannelis, Nicholas C.

doi:10.1007/pl00004138

Cited by 45 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…This is in sharp contrast with the traditional rational expectation equilibrium (REE) which, as it is well known, by now is not "sensitive" (does not take into account) to the private information of an agent (see Allen and Yannelis, 2001, and the reference there for a discussion of those issues).…”

Section: Introductioncontrasting

confidence: 40%

Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces

2005

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We consider a differential information economy with infinitely many commodities and analyze the veto power of the grand coalition with respect the ability of blocking non-Walrasian expectations equilibrium allocations. We provide two different Walrasian expectations equilibrium equivalence results. First by perturbing the initial endowments in a precise direction we show that an allocation is a Walrasian expectations equilibrium if and only if it is not “privately dominated” by the grand coalition. The second characterization deals with the fuzzy veto in the sense of Aubin but within a differential information setting. This second equivalence result provides a different characterization for the Walrasian expectations equilibrium and shows that the grand coalition privately blocks in the sense of Aubin any non Walrasian expectations equilibrium allocation with endowment participation rate arbitrarily close to the total initial endowment participation for every individual. Finally, we show that any no free disposal Walrasian expectations equilibria is coalitional Bayesian incentive compatible. Since the deterministic Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model is a special case of the differential information economy model, one derives new characterizations of the Walrasian equilibria in economies with infinitely many commodities. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005Differential information economy, Walrasian expectations equilibrium, Radner equilibrium, Privately non-dominated allocations, Private core, Aubin private core, Coalitional Bayesian incentive compatibility.,

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Section: Introductioncontrasting

confidence: 40%

Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces

2005

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“…Since x k is private, it has the form [2,3]( where χ A stands for the indicator function of the set A); the equality holds almost everywhere. The feasibility constraint (1) taken for ω ∈ [0, 1] and ω ∈ [2, 2 +…”

Section: Continuity Of the Private Corementioning

confidence: 99%

On the continuity of equilibrium and core correspondences in economies with differential information

et al. 2005

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“…10 See also Allen and Yannelis (2001) for a review of work on differential information economies. 11 See, e.g., Davey and Priestley (1990).…”

Section: Appendix: Omitted Proofsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive compatible contractible information

Bond¹

2003

Economic Theory

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The paper seeks to characterize what information is always available for contracting, independent of the form of the contract and the probabilities of different states of nature. The paper denotes such information as contractible. It is established that it is possible to speak uniquely of maximal contractible information. Several characterizations are exhibited. In particular, it is shown that if either (a) punishments are bounded everywhere, or (b) deviations from truth-telling are either always or never detected, then maximum contractible information coincides with where is the information partition of agent j. An argument is given for why (b) may be expected to hold. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003Keywords and Phrases:Contractible information, Incentive compatibility, Information partition, Common knowledge, Cross-reporting., JEL Classification Numbers:D78, D82.,

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Differential information economies: Introduction

Cited by 45 publications

References 41 publications

Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces

Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces

On the continuity of equilibrium and core correspondences in economies with differential information

Incentive compatible contractible information

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