The veto mechanism in atomic differential information economies

Abstract

We establish new characterizations of Walrasian expectations equilibria based on the veto mechanism in the framework of differential information economies with a finite number of states of nature and a measure space of agents that may have atoms. We show that it is enough to consider the veto power of a single coalition, consisting of the entire set of agents, to obtain the Aubin private core. Moreover, we investigate on the veto power of arbitrary small and big coalitions, providing an extension to mixed markets of the well known Schmeidler [20] and Vind's [22] results in terms of Aubin private core allocations.

Coalitional fairness with participation rates

“…Such result is proved in[7, Theorem 4.13] for finite economies and in[27, Theorem 3.1] for general mixed markets with finitely many goods. It can also be extended to our present setting.…”

Fairness and fuzzy coalitions

“…This policy is also widespread in the literature. See, among others, Florenzano (1990), Noguchi (2000), Liu and Liu (2014), Pesce (2014) and Bhowmik and Graziano (2015) for the equivalence Walras-Aubin-Core in different frameworks; Hervés-Estévez and Moreno-García (2015), Hervés-Beloso et al (2018) and Graziano et al (2020) for the link between W ei and the bargaining set, and Yang et al (2011) between the bargaining set and the Aubin-core. The paper is organized as follows.…”