Private property and public interest in fisheries management: the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery

Phillips, Gregory Vincent; Kriwoken, Lorne K.; Hay, Pete

doi:10.1016/s0308-597x(02)00026-x

Cited by 19 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…individual transferable or non-transferable quotas (ITQs or IQs)], granted to individuals, groups of individuals or communities [5,8]. However, we should be cautious that right-based approaches might also be subject to incentives' distortion if, for example, the rights' system tends to exacerbate wealth inequality and social division as has been the case in a number of ITQ systems (absentee quota owners, and contract harvesters with significantly less benefits than quota owners) [45][46][47]. Granting secure rights to resources to those actively involved in the fishery seems to be a necessary step for promoting sustainable-use.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The unintended consequences of formal fisheries policies: Social disparities and resource overuse in a major fishing community in the Gulf of California, Mexico

et al. 2010

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The unintended consequences of formal fisheries policies: Social disparities and resource overuse in a major fishing community in the Gulf of California, Mexico

et al. 2010

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“…Freeriding, shirking, corruption, and rent seeking are examples (Ostrom et al 1993) Many forms of transaction costs are problematic during the establishment of a new institutional arrangement (Libecap 1989;North 1990). Strategic costs, particularly rent seeking, are potent issues during the initial allocation of a de facto property right such as ITQs (Criddle and Macinko 2000;Phillips et al 2002) and have been documented in the allocation of other common pool resources (Libecap 2007). Thus, understanding the role transaction costs played in the efforts to develop an ITQ approach to golden crab management is critical.…”

Section: Emergence Of Resource Management Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Renegotiating property rights in the Florida golden crab fishery

2013

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Abstract:The golden crab (Chaceon fenneri) supports a small, economically healthy fishery in south Florida. Crabbers in the fishery have successfully protected themselves against larger outside fishing interests in the past, and management has been stable for over 15 years. Why, then, did a portion of the fleet propose shifting to individual transferable quotas (ITQs)? Our findings suggest that proponents sought ITQ management because they believed it would further limit the ability of other crabbers to enter the fishery and act as a mechanism to legally preserve the informal and formal property rights that they have previously negotiated among themselves. Opponents believed that a shift to an ITQ regime would destroy those same property rights. We explore the implications of these findings to a broader understanding of property rights and natural resource management institutions, noting that the currently existing system closely resembles a territorial use rights fishery (TURF).

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“…In this paper, we address the particularly legal problem created by private property rights, which contribute to these rights being inflexible, easily captured, and potentially incompatible with a precautionary approach to harvesting from uncertain and dynamic ecosystems (Copes, 1998;Phillips et al, 2002;Acheson et al, 2015;Bromley, 2009). To facilitate our analysis, we use an empirical case study of the informal individual tradable quota (ITQ) system in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (henceforth UK) to illustrate some of these potential negative impacts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fishing rights, property rights, human rights: the problem of legal lock-in in UK fisheries

Appleby

Cardwell

Pettipher

2018

Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene

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Property rights are a widely advocated policy tool to encourage stewardship over a range of environmental goods. Despite the extent to which property rights are dependent upon law to work, economists rarely consider that property rights are enmeshed within a complex web of pre-existing national and international legal frameworks—such as human rights law—that put strict limitations on the way they operate. This important issue is illustrated here with reference to the legal struggles in the UK around the “ownership” of fishing rights. The social and economic changes under market-based management in the UK made the fisheries regulatory regime unpopular, and undoubtedly contributed to the overwhelming vote within the catch sector to leave the European Union, even though the responsibility to allocate fishing opportunities to the British fishing industry lay with the UK authorities. The lesson from the UK experience is that despite the legal-blindness of much resource economics, the application of economic theory should not outrun its legal foundations. We conclude that promoting the allocation of public fishing rights to the private sector without adequate safeguards—such as a valuation of the rights in question and carefully considered written terms and conditions—could be considered negligent.

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Private property and public interest in fisheries management: the Tasmanian rock lobster fishery

Cited by 19 publications

References 10 publications

The unintended consequences of formal fisheries policies: Social disparities and resource overuse in a major fishing community in the Gulf of California, Mexico

The unintended consequences of formal fisheries policies: Social disparities and resource overuse in a major fishing community in the Gulf of California, Mexico

Renegotiating property rights in the Florida golden crab fishery

Fishing rights, property rights, human rights: the problem of legal lock-in in UK fisheries

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