The unintended consequences of formal fisheries policies: Social disparities and resource overuse in a major fishing community in the Gulf of California, Mexico

Cinti, Ana; Shaw, William W.; Cudney-Bueno, Richard; Rojo, Mario

doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2009.08.002

Cited by 93 publications

(119 citation statements)

References 15 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

113

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Data reported by Cinti et al (2010) through the PANGAS 1 project fishing log program in 2007 at Kino Viejo fishing grounds showed a lower CPUE (1.1 kg of adductor muscle/h diving) than that found in 2009 by this study at Seri fishing grounds (5.9 kg of adductor muscle/h diving). 2 Fishers' reports that Seri fishing grounds are more abundant and "generally doing much better than any other in the region" were confirmed through underwater surveys by Moreno et al (2005a), who found densities of less than 5 individuals per 300 m 2 in most of the Kino Viejo fishing grounds.…”

Section: Introductioncontrasting

confidence: 58%

“…1), operate under an open access regime (Cinti et al, 2010;Basurto and Ostrom, 2009). Cinti et al (2010) found that this is due partly because most fishers cannot participate in collective-choice processes where formal rules to control access to fishing grounds are established. For the most part only fishing permit holders can participate in these processes.…”

Section: A Comparison Of Fishing Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Fishing permit holders are not fishers themselves but fish-buyers in control of commercialization channels and have little incentives for conservation. Why most small-scale fishers in Kino Viejo cannot gain access to arenas of institutional design is beyond the scope of this paper and adequately examined in Cinti et al (2010).…”

Section: A Comparison Of Fishing Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When enough uproar about such rule-breaking is created within the community, permits to authorized entrants to the fishery are forfeited-despite authorized entrants' protests-and the overall result is that fishing effort in the Infiernillo Channel decreases (Basurto, 2005). 6 2 The estimates for Kino Viejo are based on data provided in two log books from Cerro Prieto fishing site (see Cinti et al, 2010 …”

Section: A Comparison Of Fishing Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Institutional and ecological interplay for successful self-governance of community-based fisheries

Basurto

Coleman

2010

Ecological Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of the role of institutional arrangements and ecological factors that facilitate the emergence and sustainability of successful collective action in small-scale fishing social-ecological systems. Using a modified logistic growth function, we simulate how ecological factors (i.e. carrying capacity) affect small-scale fishing communities with varying degrees of institutional development (i.e. timeliness to adopt new institutions and the degree to which harvesting effort is reduced), in their ability to avoid overexploitation. Our results show that strong and timely institutions are necessary but not sufficient to maintain sustainable harvests over time. The sooner communities adopt institutions, and the stronger the institutions they adopt, the more likely they are to sustain the resource stock. Exactly how timely the institutions must be adopted, and by what amount harvesting effort must be diminished, depends on the ecological carrying capacity of the species at the particular location. Small differences in the carrying capacity between fishing sites, even under scenarios of similar institutional development, greatly affects the likelihood of effective collective action.

show abstract

Section: Introductioncontrasting

confidence: 58%

Section: A Comparison Of Fishing Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Comparison Of Fishing Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Comparison Of Fishing Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Institutional and ecological interplay for successful self-governance of community-based fisheries

Basurto

Coleman

2010

Ecological Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The heterogeneous preferences among users (Cinti et al 2010) and the divergent characteristics of the SES gave rise to different responses to the problem of resource management: the increasing collective-choice and collective-actions towards sustainable management in MH-PC vs. the instauration of non-sustainable practices in BBE. This internal conflict creates the incapacity to build strong trust and reciprocity among all users in the SES, being an important barrier for an integrated community-based management.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Characterization of an artisanal fishery in Argentina using the social-ecological systems framework

London¹,

Rojas²,

Martín³

et al. 2017

Int J Commons

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) studies how institutions (the rules of the game of a society) determine the performance of a social-economic system. Elinor Ostrom extends the institutional analysis to the collective action for a particular case, the study of the social-ecological systems (SESs) (Ostrom 1990). Any group that attempts to manage a common resource (e.g. aquifers, pastures) for optimal sustainable production must solve a set of problems in order to create institutions to facilitate collective action. Some evidences show that following a set of design principles in creating institutions can lead to overcome these problems. The aim of the paper is to apply the SES framework to an artisanal fishery community in Argentina in order to: 1) describe the principal features, key variables and relations of the small-scale fishery system; 2) detect the principal drivers of a potential common-management and the leading detractors from the current communal performance; and 3) analyze the possibility that a self-governing for sustainable fishery may appear. Several drivers for potential common-management and some detractors from the current common performance are summarized. Artisanal fishery SES is currently at a bifurcation point. A common historical and cultural root, the presence of leaderships, the relevance of local knowledge, the dependence on the resource to sustainable livelihoods and the threat of big-scale fisheries area have generated incentives to collectiveaction. But, simultaneously, internal conflicts are the most important barrier for an integrated community-based management. The heterogeneity among actors and the relevant external conditions have resulted in two groups diverging in their self-organization. The work is framed by the project COMET-LA (COmmunitybased Management of Environmental challenges in Latin America; European Commission's Seventh Framework Programme of Research and Development), which aims to identify sustainable community-based governance for the management of natural resources that can be used in different social-ecological systems in a context of climate change and increasing competition in the use of resources.

show abstract

Integral Management Zones: A novel strategy for marine bivalve production in the Gulf of California, Mexico

Soria,

Fernández‐Rivera Melo,

Tortolini

et al. 2024

Aquatic Conservation

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The development of area‐based tools that combine fishing, aquaculture and repopulation practices is increasingly necessary and important to conserve ecosystems, promote sustainable use of marine resources and contribute to the well‐being of the people that rely on them. In the Gulf of California, Mexico, two small‐scale fishers' cooperatives were granted a Permit for Exploratory Aquaculture of bivalve species, and their members decided to set three zones within those concessions: (i) a zone for natural seed collection and repopulation, (ii) a no‐take zone and (iii) an area where fishing was allowed. This management arrangement, named by them as the Integral Management Zone (Zona de Manejo Integral), was conceived as an innovative alternative to the current policy tools available in the Mexican General Law for Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture. The natural collection of bivalve larvae in the artificial collectors was sufficient to allow the development of the repopulation project. Based on hydrodynamic models of larval dispersal, self‐recruitment was low, and the collection of seed depended on distant sources. The broader scale (regional) connectivity source–sink patterns should be considered in the design stages of the Integral Management Zones. The implementation of the Integral Management Zones can complement other conservation and fisheries management tools available in Mexican environmental and fisheries laws. The approach envisioned to implement this tool is participative, with a meaningful role of local fishers in the decisions concerning the use of these zones, with a supportive engagement of governmental and other stakeholders (e.g., academia and civil society organizations).

show abstract

The unintended consequences of formal fisheries policies: Social disparities and resource overuse in a major fishing community in the Gulf of California, Mexico

Cited by 93 publications

References 15 publications

Institutional and ecological interplay for successful self-governance of community-based fisheries

Institutional and ecological interplay for successful self-governance of community-based fisheries

Characterization of an artisanal fishery in Argentina using the social-ecological systems framework

Integral Management Zones: A novel strategy for marine bivalve production in the Gulf of California, Mexico

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About