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We argue that the fisheries management literature often does a poor job of analyzing issues related to institutional design and performance. The article begins by examining four competing institutional arrangements used to manage fisheries: bureaucracy, markets, community, and comanagement. The differences are used to highlight the importance of understanding critical issues related to institutional analysis. The article then examines some of the common problems or pitfalls that analysts fall victim to when examining institutional design and performance. We conclude by summarizing the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, one approach to institutional analysis that avoids these common pitfalls.

ABSTRACT. Within fisheries and natural resource management literature, there is considerable discussion about the key roles that property rights can play in building biologically and socially sustainable resource management regimes. A key point of agreement is that secure long-term property rights provide an incentive for resource users to manage the resource sustainably. However, property rights mismatches create ambiguity and conflict in resource use. Though the term mismatches is usually associated with problems in matching temporal and spatial resource characteristics with institutional characteristics, I expand it here to include problems that can arise when property rights are incompletely defined or incompletely distributed. Property rights mismatches are particularly likely to occur over marine resources, for which multiple types of resource and resource user can be engaged and managed under a variety of regulatory regimes. I used New Zealand's marine resources to examine the causes and consequences of these property rights mismatches. New Zealand is particularly interesting because its property-rights-based commercial fishing regime, in the form of individual transferable quotas, has attracted considerable positive attention. However, my review of the marine natural resource management regime from a broader property rights perspective highlights a series of problems caused by property rights mismatches, including competition for resources among commercial, customary, and recreational fishers; spatial conflict among many marine resource users; and conflicting incentives and objectives for the management of resources over time. The use of a property rights perspective also highlights some potential solutions such as the layering of institutional arrangements and the improvement of how property rights are defined to encourage long-term sustainability.

Market-based approaches to environmental regulation (such as tradable permits or transferable quotas) are frequently offered as innovative solutions to many environmental problems. Globally, one of the most well-established forms of this approach is individual transferable quotas (or ITQs) in fisheries management. Within the natural resource management community, there is considerable debate over the effects ITQs have on the fishing industry and fisher behavior although this approach is not well-established in the United States. The previously imposed moratorium on ITQs in the United States has expired and the 2006 reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Act explicitly provides for limited access privileges (LAPs). A variety of fishers, regulators, and conservation organizations are enthusiastically seeking to introduce ITQ management. With debate over whether and how ITQs should be used in American fisheries reinvigorated, it is timely to examine the evidence on the social and economic effects of ITQs in other nations' fisheries. After briefly summarizing the debate on ITQs, we examine the case of New Zealand, one of the earliest and longest-lived ITQ-based fisheries regimes. We use multiple data sources and methods to analyze the extent to which industry consolidation and aggregation has occurred, including surveys of industry participants, expert interviews, reviews of academic reports and analyses, analysis of trade publications, and direct analysis of quota ownership patterns. This analysis shows a more complex outcome than recent debates in the ITQ literature would predict. These findings suggest that policy makers considering ITQs can learn from the experiences of other countries related to key issues such as quota allocation, aggregation limits, transferability, cost recovery, and resource sustainability when designing ITQ and other LAP systems. It is also important to explicitly identify economic and social objectives and then carefully design ITQ regimes to meet these objectives.

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