Presidential Leverage and the Politics of Policy Formulation

Abstract

This article applies a concept of "presidential leverage" to the inner workings of the White House, specifically decisions regarding the location of policy formulation. The guiding question addresses how a president's leverage in the political system influences decisions regarding policy making. Findings support the propositions that (1) leverage has a systematic impact on presidential policy formation, (2) divided government has little or no impact on policy making location, and (3) presidents who are ideologically compatible with Congress are less likely to centralize. I conclude with some general thoughts on the current state of presidential leverage.

The Institutional Presidency in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis

“…Students of the U.S. presidency have shown that presidents have incentives to create and strengthen technical, administrative, and advisory presidential supports both to confront critical junctures—the modern U.S. presidency emerged after the Great Depression—and to face the challenges posed by the system of “separated institutions sharing powers.” At the same time, scholars have documented the increasing centralization of authority around the person of the chief executive and the steady movement towards the institutional reinforcement of the political core executive for most advanced industrial countries over the last forty to fifty years (Peters et al ). According to this literature, the growth of the institutional presidency is connected to developments within the larger political system—that is, the governmental and political challenges that presidents face (Moe ; Mezey ; Ponder ). Presidents adjust the format and tasks of the agencies under their authority to manage their relationship with the political environment.…”

“…At the same time, scholars have documented the increasing centralization of authority around the person of the chief executive and the steady movement towards the institutional reinforcement of the political core executive for most advanced industrial countries over the last forty to fifty years (Peters et al 2000). According to this literature, the growth of the institutional presidency is connected to developments within the larger political system-that is, the governmental and political challenges that presidents face (Moe 1985;Mezey 2013;Ponder 2012). Presidents adjust the format and tasks of the agencies under their authority to manage their relationship with the political environment.…”

The Institutional Presidency from a Comparative Perspective: Argentina and Brazil since the 1980s

“…In short, the centralization of agencies and personnel under direct presidential authority is a typical mechanism with which presidents have responded to developments occuring in the wider political system (PONDER, 2012). The growth of the institutional presidency has been connected to the need to confront critical contextual challenges, increasing government responsibilities, and political and institutional uncertainties.…”

“…These agencies are part of the bureaucracy of the executive branch, but they are not located within the executive cabinet; their defining characteristic is that they operate under the direct authority of the president and are responsible for supporting the presidential leadership (DICKINSON, 2005). Following the specialized literature, we argue that the growth of the institutional presidency is connected to developments occurring in the larger political system -that is, to the governmental and political challenges that presidents face (MEZEY, 2013;MOE, 1985;PONDER, 2012). Presidents adjust the format and mandate of the different agencies under their authority so as to better manage their relations with the wider political environment.…”