Popularity as a Poor Proxy for Utility

Social psychological research on prejudice as collective action supporting emergent ingroup members

“…Indeed, perceived threat is likely to be higher for conflicts between emergent ingroups and emergent outgroups amid social change (Crandall et al ., ). As emergent ingroups become more established in society and protected by institutions, researchers lose interest in conducting research supporting these groups and such work slowly comes to an end (Mitchell & Tetlock, ). Also, the EIM explains why a wide range of social groups who suffer from serious threats within society are rarely able to capture the interest of prejudice researchers – they are simply not recategorized as emergent ingroup members (Reicher, ).…”

Advancing women in medical leadership

“…Substantive equality allows different groups to be treated differently to enable members of these groups to enjoy equal human rights. It is the philosophical justification for the legal instrument of “special measures”, as described in the Australian Human Rights Commission guidelines on special measures under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) . Special measures allow for “lawful” discrimination, without which, for example, leadership programs for women and quotas would be unlawful under anti‐discrimination legislation.…”

If Nazi = Red, and Canadian = Red, does Red = Good or Bad? Testing the effects of valenced perceptual cues on Implicit Association Test performance

“…However, despite this operationalization, the choice to also use the implicit-explicit distinction to capture a wide range of psychological processes clustered together into two distinct groups leaves it with the same fundamental problem as any dual-process typology. Indeed, one might say that this fundamental problem is an implicit feature of Greenwald and Banaji's (1995) theory of implicit cognition, as evidenced by the continued memetic use of implicit cognition theory-and the measurement tools this theory has inspired-inside and outside of academia (see Greenwald & Banaji, 2017;Mitchell & Tetlock, 2017).…”

“…Indeed, many theories of implicit cognition fail to account for the findings of research using implicit measures (see Brownstein et al, 2019;Corneille & Stahl, 2019;. Despite this misalignment, it is the empirically unsupported and unjustifiable memes about implicit cognition (see Brownstein et al, 2019;Corneille & Stahl, 2019;;Greenwald & Banaji, 2017;Mitchell & Tetlock, 2017) which continue to dominate conversation, research, and policy about implicit biases/attitudes/associations/prejudices/stereotypes (e.g., Comey, 2015;Gladwell, 2007;Google, 2013;Starbucks, 2018).…”

“…CHANGING PERFORMANCE ON IMPLICIT MEASURES 9 Thus, rather than treating the IAT as a brand new measure which had yet to face the scrutiny of peer-review or have its psychometric properties validated, Greenwald et al (1998) simply made claim of the IAT's measurement capabilities without supporting evidence. Unfortunately, these unsubstantiated claims were rarely challenged in the decade after the IAT's creation (De Houwer, 2006); likely due to these claims aligning with the ideological symapthies and research agendas of researchers interested in the IAT (see Mitchell & Tetlock, 2017). 1 However, the spread of these ideas could have been easily avoided through the use of more honest, scientifically conservative, language.…”