Social and political change involves a challenge to the status quo in intergroup power relations. Traditionally, the social psychology of social change has focused on disadvantaged minority groups collectively challenging the decisions, actions, and policies of those in positions of established authority. In contrast, this article presents a political solidarity model of social change that explores the process by which members of the majority challenge the authority in solidarity with the minority. It is argued that political solidarity as a social change process involves a contest between the authority and the minority over the meaning of a shared (higher order) identity with the majority. When identity ceases to be shared with the authority and becomes shared with the minority, majority challenge to authority in solidarity with the minority becomes possible. The model's contributions to existing social psychological approaches to social change are also discussed.

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Research on group identification has shown it to be a surprisingly weak predictor of intentions to take large-scale social action. The weak links may exist because researchers have not always examined identification with the type of group that is most relevant for predicting action. Our focus in two studies (one in Romania and one in Australia, both Ns ¼ 101) was on opinion-based groups (i.e. groups formed around shared opinions). We found that social identification with opinion-based groups was an excellent predictor of political behavioural intentions, particularly when items measuring identity certainty were included. The results provide clear evidence of the role of social identity constructs for predicting commitment to social action and complement analyses of politicised collective identity and crowd behaviour.

A growing body of research points to the contribution of social identity and self‐categorization processes to organizational social capital. In particular, this is because all facets of collective behaviour (e.g., trust, communication, leadership, productivity) are facilitated to the extent that individuals define themselves in terms of higher‐order social categories (i.e., as members of a common ingroup). However, very little work has sought to translate these social and cognitive insights into models of organizational practice. In an attempt to do this, the present paper outlines a four‐phase model for Actualizing Social and Personal Identity Resources (the ASPIRe model). Within a relevant organizational unit, an initial phase involves ascertaining which social identities employees use collectively to define themselves (AIRing). In intermediate phases, relevant subgroups and then the organizational unit as a whole develop goals that are relevant to those identities (Sub‐Casing and Super‐Casing). In a final phase, organizational planning and direction are informed by the outcomes of the previous two phases and by the new organic organizational identity they produce (ORGanizing). Points of contact with alternative models are identified and the model's potential to encourage sustainable productivity is discussed.

In recent years, there has been a renewal of interest in the processes through which groups coordinate social perceptions and judgement. This topic is particularly important for the study of stereotyping, as most of the impact of stereotypes derives from the fact that they are widely shared within social groups. The present experiment (N = 132) tests the assertion that perceivers are more likely to generate a shared in-group stereotype to the extent that they define themselves and interact in terms of a common social category membership. Results supported predictions, indicating that manipulations intended to heighten social identity salience affected the content of self-categorizations leading to enhanced stereotype consensus and favorableness. As predicted, effects apparent when individuals completed stereotype checklists were also enhanced when checklists were completed in groups. These results are consistent with predictions derived from self-categorization theory and point to the capacity for internalized group memberships to structure and regulate cognition.