Political Islam in Palestine in an environment of peace?

Milton‐Edwards, Beverley

doi:10.1080/01436599650035644

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…32 When PA forces tried to collect the arms of the Islamic Jihad and the Hamas, they were compared to the [collaborationist] South Lebanese Army of General Antoine Lahad. 33 Arrests of opposition activists continued during 1995, after the State Security Court was set up by a decree issued by Yasir Arafat. Dozens of Hamas and Islamic Jihad activists (probably members of their military wings) were sentenced to long periods of prison in summary trials and without due process.…”

Section: Security Policy and The Question Of Collaborationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Society–Military Relations in a State-in-the-Making

Cohen

2011

Armed Forces & Society

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The participation of the Palestinian Authority's (PA's) security agencies in the armed struggle against Israel in the second Palestinian uprising (2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005) is analyzed in this article as a response to the demand of Palestinian society, thus as a unique case of armed forces which, in the lack of political directive, became more attentive to public opinion. The article shows how Palestinian public discourse in the late 1990s-early 2000s, that was shaped by the Islamic movement of Hamas, portrayed the PA's security officials as traitors. Members of the PA security agencies (mainly Fatah members) sought to reposition themselves in the ''national camp,'' and this motivated them to raise their weapons against Israeli targets. By doing so, they also removed the mental burden of turning their weapons against fellow Palestinians that was one of the major sources for their image as collaborators.

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Section: Security Policy and The Question Of Collaborationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Society–Military Relations in a State-in-the-Making

Cohen

2011

Armed Forces & Society

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“…The primary way in which Hamas distinguishes itself from the jihadi salafi impulse of al-Qaeda is that it is fundamentally a local and quasi-nationalist expression and interpretation of reformist Islamist philosophies more strongly associated with Hassan al-Banna than with Sayyid Qutb. The 'radicalization' of Palestinian Islamism has historically been intimately connected to the local political arena rather than the global one (see Milton-Edwards, 1996).…”

Section: Radical Islamist Doctrine On Hudna and Jihadmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Current Palestinian Islamism and strategies for peace and security lay in the roots of the first Palestinian intifada and the subsequent framing of the Oslo peace process. The phenomenon of Islamism in the Palestinian arena is deeply tied to the movement for opposition to Zionism and British occupation that grew in the early part of the 20th century (see Milton-Edwards, 1996). In the late 1980s, however, Palestinian Islamism was consolidated and given a new populist facet through the militant Islamic Jihad organization in the first intifada and the emergence of a larger political Islamic movement called Hamas.…”

Section: A Road Less Travelledmentioning

confidence: 99%

Waving, Not Drowning: Strategic Dimensions of Ceasefires and Islamic Movements

Milton‐Edwards

Crooke

2004

Security Dialogue

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In the arena of ethno-national conflict, the adoption of a ceasefire is regarded as a key trigger for allowing the development of subsequent political initiatives in peacemaking. Armed elements within Islamism, however, are often understood as ruling out ceasefire and promoting a counter-agenda of armed struggle without compromise. Thus, in Israel and in the international community, most regarded the Hamas and Islamic Jihad ceasefire (hudna) of June 2003 with suspicion. Yet, in this respect, there was a failure to recognize that Islamists were waving, not drowning, with respect to signalling a new attitude towards the political process that animates Palestinian-Israeli encounters. This article seeks to analyse the contradiction inherent in current demands on contemporary Islamists and the part that they can play in reaching the strategic goal of peace and security. Principally, the concept of ceasefire and Islamist discourse on contemporary security issues will be examined in order to illustrate the relevance of these issues to wider dimensions of regional and global security debates.A ceasefire is acceptable, but not if we deny our rights to exist in the process. If the West deny us security and safety, we have to seek it for ourselves. 1 T HE ANNOUNCEMENT IN JUNE 2003 of a unilateral ceasefire (hudna) by armed Palestinian elements, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, was seen as a breakthrough in the scaffolding of Israeli-Palestinian relations through the so-called road map sponsored by the international quartet of the USA, the UN, Russia and the EU. The product of years of internal discourse and months of secret negotiations within the Palestinian body politic, the hudna offered a glimmer of hope for all parties involved in

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“…46 On a more general level, Hamas has always taken pains to separate its formal dialogue with Fateh, which Hamas considers a legitimate organisation, and the PA itself, which is seen as an outgrowth of the Oslo Accords and therefore as lacking in popular legitimacy. 47 …”

Section: Hamas's Welfare Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Crescent and Sword: The Hamas enigma

Knudsen

2005

Third World Quarterly

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Political Islam in Palestine in an environment of peace?

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

Society–Military Relations in a State-in-the-Making

Society–Military Relations in a State-in-the-Making

Waving, Not Drowning: Strategic Dimensions of Ceasefires and Islamic Movements

Crescent and Sword: The Hamas enigma

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