Waving, Not Drowning: Strategic Dimensions of Ceasefires and Islamic Movements

Abstract

In the arena of ethno-national conflict, the adoption of a ceasefire is regarded as a key trigger for allowing the development of subsequent political initiatives in peacemaking. Armed elements within Islamism, however, are often understood as ruling out ceasefire and promoting a counter-agenda of armed struggle without compromise. Thus, in Israel and in the international community, most regarded the Hamas and Islamic Jihad ceasefire (hudna) of June 2003 with suspicion. Yet, in this respect, there was a failure to recognize that Islamists were waving, not drowning, with respect to signalling a new attitude towards the political process that animates Palestinian-Israeli encounters. This article seeks to analyse the contradiction inherent in current demands on contemporary Islamists and the part that they can play in reaching the strategic goal of peace and security. Principally, the concept of ceasefire and Islamist discourse on contemporary security issues will be examined in order to illustrate the relevance of these issues to wider dimensions of regional and global security debates.A ceasefire is acceptable, but not if we deny our rights to exist in the process. If the West deny us security and safety, we have to seek it for ourselves. 1 T HE ANNOUNCEMENT IN JUNE 2003 of a unilateral ceasefire (hudna) by armed Palestinian elements, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad, was seen as a breakthrough in the scaffolding of Israeli-Palestinian relations through the so-called road map sponsored by the international quartet of the USA, the UN, Russia and the EU. The product of years of internal discourse and months of secret negotiations within the Palestinian body politic, the hudna offered a glimmer of hope for all parties involved in

Introduction

“…Although Hamas's acceptance of a two-state solution is worded as a temporary measure, defended ideologically through the Islamic concept of hudna (long-term truce), it implies an acknowledgment of Israel's existence. 5 As for previous agreements between Israel and the Palestinians, Hamas has said little, apart from its blatant condemnation of the Oslo accords, which were all but declared dead with the outbreak of the second intifada in the fall of 2000. 6 However, the movement's willingness to join the PLO through PNC elections implicitly means that it is ready to adhere to previous agreements, at least until Hamas can overturn them from within the PLO.…”