Crescent and Sword: The Hamas enigma

Consociation in a Constant State of Contingency? The case of the Palestinian Territory

“…39 In a context where the majority of Palestinians live in poverty, Hamas is able to derive popular support by providing welfare services, which account for almost all of its revenues. 40 Since the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007 the movement has not sought to replace governmental institutions inherited from the Palestinian Authority (PA) but rather has 'systematically secured a firm control over government institutions by replacing the officials at the management level in some ministries-or the entire staff in others-with Hamas affiliates'. Even in those sectors of the public administration where staff have remained-namely the health and education sectors-management-level posts are now held by Hamas loyalists.…”

Explaining Hamas's Changing Electoral Strategy, 1996–2006

“…With the assassinations of Yasin and his successor in the course of a few months in 2004, further moderation became at risk (Knudsen 2005(Knudsen : 1373. According to minister Mohammad Barghouti, the assassinations could have re-radicalized Hamas, as even moderate voices called for retaliation against Israel.…”

“…In 1994, responding to the Hebron massacre, Hamas carried out its first suicide operations (Knudsen 2005(Knudsen : 1381. Israeli security forces responded in kind, and in collaboration with the Palestinian National Authority a large number of suspected activists were arrested, assassinated or deported.…”

“…In the course of a few years it had grown to become one of the most powerful Palestinian movements, and by 1992 it had surpassed the Brotherhood as the leading Palestinian religious political movement. Hamas eventually inherited the Brotherhood's network of welfare institutions and supplemented military operations with social work (Gunning 2008: 39;Knudsen 2005Knudsen : 1382. 6 The diversification of operations and rapid expansion strained Hamas's bureaucratic capacity.…”

Questioning the Secular-Religious Cleavage in Palestinian Politics: Comparing Fatah and Hamas

“…29 While Hamas's pivotal role in the intifada is one factor explaining the movement's popularity, it seems reasonable to assume that the increasing religiosity among Palestinians also played a part in its rise to prominence. Representing an Islamist alternative to the secular nationalists headed by Fatah, Hamas could easily exploit the increasing numbers of religious -and also politically disenfranchised -Palestinians as their constituency (Abu-Amr 1993; Gunning 2008, 39;Knudsen 2005Knudsen , 1382Knudsen -1384Robinson 1997, 149). Underlining Hamas's Islamist roots, the 1988 Charter proclaims its ultimate goal as being to raise "the banner of Allah on every inch of Palestine" 30 and establish an Islamic state throughout what are today Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories.…”