Phenomenology-first versus third-person approaches in the science of consciousness: the case of the integrated information theory and the unfolding argument

Negro, Niccolò

doi:10.1007/s11097-020-09681-3

Cited by 19 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…While not a major theme within the many responses to the unfolding argument to-date ( Kleiner 2019 ; Ganesh 2020 ; Negro 2020 ; Tsuchiya et al 2020 ), we believe that discrete time (i.e. time t and t' ) is at the core of this controversy.…”

Section: Time Consciousness In Iit and Gnwtmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…That is a strong claim but to take phenomenology seriously in consciousness research means grounding experimental findings in first-person accounts of their own (cf. our own) experience ( Negro 2020 ). Do you/I/we experience discrete or continuous temporal flow?…”

Section: Time Consciousness In Iit and Gnwtmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…The other theories only address short temporal integration on the millisecond level, i.e. between 100 and 300 ms. We argue that this confinement leads to intractable problems within and between theories of consciousness, citing the recent controversy surrounding the “unfolding argument” as a prime example ( Kleiner 2019 ; Doerig et al 2019b ; Ganesh 2020 ; Negro 2020 ; Tsuchiya et al 2020 ).…”

Section: Duration: Time Consciousness Is Extendedmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If IIT predictions do not accord with the integration of information and conscious states over timescales of the experienced present, which is extended, then those predictions and some of the theory could be considered falsified. In response to the unfolding argument, Negro (2020 , 7) proposes that IIT would be at least partially falsified if “the informational structure did not change at the same temporal scale of the stimulus and the phenomenal experience, or, even worse, if it did not change at all.” This is because causal structure theories like IIT require strict isomorphism between phenomenal and physical structures ( Tsuchiya et al 2020 ). Taking the stimulus out of the picture, the phenomenology of time consciousness also requires that the informational structure be extended and made continuous in order to achieve that strict isomorphism.…”

Section: Time Consciousness In Iit and Gnwtmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If, e.g. GNWT was able to explain what IIT could not, given that it is not prone to the same isomorphic requirements ( Negro 2020 ; Tsuchiya et al 2020 ), then an experimental result could clearly favor one theory over the other.…”

Section: Long Continuous and Dynamic: Time Consciousness Can Remedymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Time consciousness: the missing link in theories of consciousness

Kent

Wittmann

2021

Neuroscience of Consciousness

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There are plenty of issues to be solved in order for researchers to agree on a neural model of consciousness. Here we emphasize an often under-represented aspect in the debate: time consciousness. Consciousness and the present moment both extend in time. Experience flows through a succession of moments and progresses from future predictions, to present experiences, to past memories. However, a brief review finds that many dominant theories of consciousness only refer to brief, static, and discrete “functional moments” of time. Very few refer to more extended, dynamic, and continuous time, which is associated with conscious experience (cf. the “experienced moment”). This confusion between short and discrete versus long and continuous is, we argue, one of the core issues in theories of consciousness. Given the lack of work dedicated to time consciousness, its study could test novel predictions of rival theories of consciousness. It may be that different theories of consciousness are compatible/complementary if the different aspects of time are taken into account. Or, if it turns out that no existing theory can fully accommodate time consciousness, then perhaps it has something new to add. Regardless of outcome, the crucial step is to make subjective time a central object of study.

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Section: Time Consciousness In Iit and Gnwtmentioning

confidence: 90%

Section: Time Consciousness In Iit and Gnwtmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Duration: Time Consciousness Is Extendedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Time Consciousness In Iit and Gnwtmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Long Continuous and Dynamic: Time Consciousness Can Remedymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Time consciousness: the missing link in theories of consciousness

Kent

Wittmann

2021

Neuroscience of Consciousness

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The transcendental deduction of Integrated Information Theory: connecting the axioms, postulates, and identity through categories

Chis-Ciure

2022

Synthese

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Can the Integrated Information Theory Explain Consciousness from Consciousness Itself?

Negro

2022

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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In consciousness science, theories often differ not only in the account of consciousness they arrive at, but also with respect to how they understand their starting point. Some approaches begin with experimentally gathered data, whereas others begin with phenomenologically gathered data. In this paper, I analyse how the most influential phenomenology-first approach, namely the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness, fits its phenomenologically gathered data with explanatory hypotheses. First, I show that experimentally driven approaches hit an explanatory roadblock, since we cannot tell, at the present stage, which model of consciousness is best. Then, I show that IIT’s phenomenology-first approach implies a self-evidencing explanation according to which consciousness can be explained by starting from consciousness itself. I claim that IIT can take advantage of the virtuous circularity of this reasoning, but it also faces a data-fitting issue that is somehow similar to that faced by experiment-driven approaches: we are not given enough information to decide whether the explanatory hypotheses IIT employs to explain its phenomenological data are in fact best. I call this problem “the self-evidencing problem” for IIT, and after introducing it, I propose a possible way for IIT to solve it.

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Phenomenology-first versus third-person approaches in the science of consciousness: the case of the integrated information theory and the unfolding argument

Cited by 19 publications

References 19 publications

Time consciousness: the missing link in theories of consciousness

Time consciousness: the missing link in theories of consciousness

The transcendental deduction of Integrated Information Theory: connecting the axioms, postulates, and identity through categories

Can the Integrated Information Theory Explain Consciousness from Consciousness Itself?

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