Humans show large differences in the preferred timing of their sleep and activity. This so-called "chronotype" is largely regulated by the circadian clock. Both genetic variations in clock genes and environmental influences contribute to the distribution of chronotypes in a given population, ranging from extreme early types to extreme late types with the majority falling between these extremes. Social (e.g., school and work) schedules interfere considerably with individual sleep preferences in the majority of the population. Late chronotypes show the largest differences in sleep timing between work and free days leading to a considerable sleep debt on work days, for which they compensate on free days. The discrepancy between work and free days, between social and biological time, can be described as 'social jetlag.' Here, we explore how sleep quality and psychological wellbeing are associated with individual chronotype and/or social jetlag. A total of 501 volunteers filled out the Munich ChronoType Questionnaire (MCTQ) as well as additional questionnaires on: (i) sleep quality (SF-A), (ii) current psychological wellbeing (Basler Befindlichkeitsbogen), (iii) retrospective psychological wellbeing over the past week (POMS), and (iv) consumption of stimulants (e.g., caffeine, nicotine, and alcohol). Associations of chronotype, wellbeing, and stimulant consumption are strongest in teenagers and young adults up to age 25 yrs. The most striking correlation exists between chronotype and smoking, which is significantly higher in late chronotypes of all ages (except for those in retirement). We show these correlations are most probably a consequence of social jetlag, i.e., the discrepancies between social and biological timing rather than a simple association to different chronotypes. Our results strongly suggest that work (and school) schedules should be adapted to chronotype whenever possible.

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The striking diversity of psychological and neurophysiological models of 'time perception' characterizes the debate on how and where in the brain time is processed. In this review, the most prominent models of time perception will be critically discussed. Some of the variation across the proposed models will be explained, namely (i) different processes and regions of the brain are involved depending on the length of the processed time interval, and (ii) different cognitive processes may be involved that are not necessarily part of a core timekeeping system but, nevertheless, influence the experience of time. These cognitive processes are distributed over the brain and are difficult to discern from timing mechanisms. Recent developments in the research on emotional influences on time perception, which succeed decades of studies on the cognition of temporal processing, will be highlighted. Empirical findings on the relationship between affect and time, together with recent conceptualizations of self-and body processes, are integrated by viewing time perception as entailing emotional and interoceptive (within the body) states. To date, specific neurophysiological mechanisms that would account for the representation of human time have not been identified. It will be argued that neural processes in the insular cortex that are related to body signals and feeling states might constitute such a neurophysiological mechanism for the encoding of duration.

A large number of competing models exist for how the brain creates a representation of time. However, several human and animal studies point to 'climbing neural activation' as a potential neural mechanism for the representation of duration. Neurophysiological recordings in animals have revealed how climbing neural activation that peaks at the end of a timed interval underlies the processing of duration, and, in humans, climbing neural activity in the insular cortex, which is associated with feeling states of the body and emotions, may be related to the cumulative representation of time.

Delay discounting refers to the fact that an immediate reward is valued more than the same reward if it occurs some time in the future. To examine the neural substrates underlying this process, we studied 13 healthy volunteers who repeatedly had to decide between an immediate and parametrically varied delayed hypothetical reward using a delay discounting task during event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging. Subject's preference judgments resulted in different discounting slopes for shorter (<1 year) and for longer (> or =1 year) delays. Neural activation associated with the shorter delays relative to the longer delays was associated with increased activation in the head of the left caudate nucleus and putamen. When individuals selected the delayed relative to the immediate reward, a strong activation was found in bilateral posterior insular cortex. Several brain areas including the left caudate nucleus showed a correlation between the behaviorally determined discounting and brain activation for the contrast of intervals with delays <1 and > or =1 year. These results suggest that (1) the posterior insula, which is a critical component of the decision-making neural network, is involved in delaying gratification and (2) the degree of neural activation in the striatum, which plays a fundamental role in reward prediction and in time estimation, may code for the time delay.

Stimulant-dependent individuals (SDI) have abnormal brain metabolism and structural changes involving dopaminergic target areas important for the processing of time. These individuals are also more impulsive and impaired in working memory and attention. The current study tested whether SDI show altered temporal processing in relation to impulsivity or impaired prefrontal cortex functioning. We employed a series of timing tasks aimed to examine time processing from the milliseconds to multiple seconds range and assessed cognitive function in 15 male SDI and 15 stimulant-naïve individuals. A mediation analysis determined the degree to which impulsivity or executive dysfunctions contributed to group differences in time processing. SDI showed several abnormal time processing characteristics. SDI needed larger time differences for effective duration discrimination, particularly for intervals of around 1 sec. SDI also accelerated finger tapping during a continuation period after a 1 Hz pacing stimulus was removed. In addition, SDI overestimated the duration of a relatively long time interval, an effect which was attributable to higher impulsivity. Taken together, these data show for the first time that SDI exhibit altered time processing in several domains, one which can be explained by increased impulsivity. Altered time processing in SDI could explain why SDI have difficulty delaying gratification.

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It has been suggested that perception and action can be understood as evolving in temporal epochs or sequential processing units. Successive events are fused into units forming a unitary experience or “psychological present.” Studies have identified several temporal integration levels on different time scales which are fundamental for our understanding of behavior and subjective experience. In recent literature concerning the philosophy and neuroscience of consciousness these separate temporal processing levels are not always precisely distinguished. Therefore, empirical evidence from psychophysics and neuropsychology on these distinct temporal processing levels is presented and discussed within philosophical conceptualizations of time experience. On an elementary level, one can identify a functional moment, a basic temporal building block of perception in the range of milliseconds that defines simultaneity and succession. Below a certain threshold temporal order is not perceived, individual events are processed as co-temporal. On a second level, an experienced moment, which is based on temporal integration of up to a few seconds, has been reported in many qualitatively different experiments in perception and action. It has been suggested that this segmental processing mechanism creates temporal windows that provide a logistical basis for conscious representation and the experience of nowness. On a third level of integration, continuity of experience is enabled by working memory in the range of multiple seconds allowing the maintenance of cognitive operations and emotional feelings, leading to mental presence, a temporal window of an individual’s experienced presence.