The transcendental deduction of Integrated Information Theory: connecting the axioms, postulates, and identity through categories

Chis-Ciure, Robert

doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03704-z

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…physical existence is an explanatory construct (a postulate) and it is assessed operationally from within consciousness" [12] (p. 2). The same is suggested by Chis-Ciure [19]: "when it comes to ontology, consciousness has primacy . .…”

Section: The Ontological Elimination Of Non-conscious Physical Entitiesmentioning

confidence: 65%

“…Although previous versions of IIT did not explicitly clarify the logic of this translation (for discussions on this point, see [16][17][18][19]), IIT 4.0 explains that the postulates are inferred via an "inference to a good explanation" from the axioms and a triad of basic assumptions [11,12]. These assumptions are realism, operational physicalism, and atomism.…”

Section: Iit Basicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recall that the 0th and 1st phenomenal axioms state that consciousness exists intrinsically, for itself, and that this phenomenal existence is the only type of existence that is given immediately, beyond any doubt. Now, if consciousness exists intrinsically, and in a way that is selfevident and immediately known, then, according to IIT adherents, consciousness is "the fundamental, the ultimate" [19] (p. 21), something "ontologically basic, in the sense that it exists fundamentally" [26] (p. 5).…”

Section: Phenomenal Existence Is True Existence: Experience As Ontolo...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0’s Realist Idealism

Cea,

Negro,

Signorelli

2023

Entropy

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Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. Here, we focus specifically on a metaphysical aspect of the theory’s most recent version (IIT 4.0), what we may call its idealistic ontology, and its tension with a kind of realism about the external world that IIT also endorses. IIT 4.0 openly rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, positing instead that consciousness is ontologically primary while the physical domain is just “operational”. However, this philosophical position is presently underdeveloped and is not rigorously formulated in IIT, potentially leading to many misinterpretations and undermining its overall explanatory power. In the present paper we aim to address this issue. We argue that IIT’s idealistic ontology should be understood as a specific combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism regarding Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. Having clarified this, we then focus on the problematic tension between IIT’s idealistic ontology and its simultaneous endorsement of realism, according to which there is some kind of external reality independent of our minds. After refuting three potential solutions to this theoretical tension, we propose the most plausible alternative: understanding IIT’s realism as an assertion of the existence of other experiences beyond one’s own, what we call a non-solipsistic idealist realism. We end with concluding remarks and future research avenues.

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Section: The Ontological Elimination Of Non-conscious Physical Entitiesmentioning

confidence: 65%

Section: Iit Basicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Phenomenal Existence Is True Existence: Experience As Ontolo...mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0’s Realist Idealism

Cea,

Negro,

Signorelli

2023

Entropy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…But, as already indicated by previous criticisms of the IIT axioms (32)(33)(34)(35), it would be desirable to argue for their presumed status as self-evident truths and make more explicit the reasoning behind turning them into postulates (36,37). Reference to introspection and reasoning alone seems a superficial means for a "phenomenology-first" approach if not accompanied by a truly phenomenological method (but see (27)). Therefore, even if one conceded that an explanation of subjective experience could be grounded in objective mechanisms, the authors' proposals lack any rigorous intersubjective valid method to introspect and extract the structure of subjective experience.…”

Section: The Primacy and Structure Of Experiencementioning

confidence: 97%

“…Appealing to this methodological and epistemological primacy might suffice for pragmatic purposes and would perhaps obviate the need to invoke metaphysical claims, e.g., about the ontological status of consciousness (26); yet, if IIT keeps its ontological commitments, it needs to ensure consistency between its methodological, explanatory and ontological aspects, something we discuss further below. For instance, there is a tension between their repeated claims of a "primary of experience" and their conception of physical reality (but see (27) for a possible strategy to overcome this. )…”

Section: The Primacy and Structure Of Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic

Signorelli¹,

Cea²,

Prentner³

2022

Preprint

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Models of consciousness need to explain both objective correlates of conscious experience as well as its subjective structure. However, such an explanation would not need to entail a reduction exclusively in terms of physical or neural systems. We briefly sketch a few points of contention with recent work on integrated information theory and some common assumptions made in the neuroscience of consciousness more generally.

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Category theory in consciousness science: going beyond the correlational project

Prentner

2024

Synthese

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We discuss the potential of applying category theory to the study of consciousness. We first review a recent proposal from the neurosciences of consciousness to illustrate the “correlational project”, using the integrated information theory of consciousness as an example. We then discuss some technical preliminaries related to categories and in particular to the notion of a functor, which carries the bulk of conceptual weight in many current discussions. We then look at possible payoffs of this project—getting to grips with the hard problem, theory integration, and exploiting explanatory dualities—and discuss possible avenues for further research, stressing the need to better develop the categorical representation of consciousness, in particular its phenomenological structure. A better understanding of consciousness cannot be achieved by merely studying the physical brain. By contrast, the categorical treatment even suggests application beyond the domain of neuroscience, for example in computer science and artificial intelligence research, while also emphasizing the primacy of (phenomenal) experience.

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The transcendental deduction of Integrated Information Theory: connecting the axioms, postulates, and identity through categories

Abstract: z, please cite the published article as: Chis-Ciure, R. The transcendental deduction of Integrated Information Theory: connecting the axioms, postulates, and identity through categories.

Cited by 6 publications

References 24 publications

The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0’s Realist Idealism

The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0’s Realist Idealism

We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic

Category theory in consciousness science: going beyond the correlational project

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