Time consciousness: the missing link in theories of consciousness

Abstract

There are plenty of issues to be solved in order for researchers to agree on a neural model of consciousness. Here we emphasize an often under-represented aspect in the debate: time consciousness. Consciousness and the present moment both extend in time. Experience flows through a succession of moments and progresses from future predictions, to present experiences, to past memories. However, a brief review finds that many dominant theories of consciousness only refer to brief, static, and discrete “functional moments” of time. Very few refer to more extended, dynamic, and continuous time, which is associated with conscious experience (cf. the “experienced moment”). This confusion between short and discrete versus long and continuous is, we argue, one of the core issues in theories of consciousness. Given the lack of work dedicated to time consciousness, its study could test novel predictions of rival theories of consciousness. It may be that different theories of consciousness are compatible/complementary if the different aspects of time are taken into account. Or, if it turns out that no existing theory can fully accommodate time consciousness, then perhaps it has something new to add. Regardless of outcome, the crucial step is to make subjective time a central object of study.

The Temporally-Integrated Causality Landscape: Reconciling Neuroscientific Theories With the Phenomenology of Consciousness

“…Fourth, consciousness is temporally continuous (Wittmann, 2011 ; Winters, 2020 ; Kent and Wittmann, 2021 ). John Searle defined consciousness as “those states of sentience and awareness that typically begin when we awake from a dreamless sleep and continue until we go to sleep again, or fall into a coma or die or otherwise become unconscious” (Searle, 1997 ).…”

“…This may reflect the nestedness of qualitative contents occurring at different temporal scales (Fingelkurts et al, 2010 ). Whether this necessitates a non-discrete mechanistic correlate in the brain remains a matter of contention (Fingelkurts et al, 2010 ; Kent et al, 2019 ; Winters, 2020 ; Kent and Wittmann, 2021 ). Nevertheless, contents are dynamic and consciousness seems to flow over an extended sense of the present (Poppel, 1997 ; Kent et al, 2019 ).…”

“…The TICL explicitly accounts for the point of view as being that of the wider, integrated System upon its internal dynamics (Winters, 2020 ). With respect to exclusion, IIT posits that conscious experience has one, definite spatial and temporal grain (Tononi et al, 2016 ), which contrasts with the view that human consciousness is temporally continuous with dynamic contents nested within it (Fingelkurts et al, 2010 , 2013 ; Wittmann, 2011 ; Northoff and Huang, 2017 ; Winters, 2020 ; Kent and Wittmann, 2021 ).…”

“…Localized increases in gamma power and synchrony are seen even with stimuli that are not consciously perceived, particularly within the first 200 ms (Melloni et al, 2007 ; Ray and Maunsell, 2010 ). Despite this, most theoretical frameworks for consciousness limit the temporal aspects of consciousness to a few hundred ms timescales (Northoff and Lamme, 2020 ; Kent and Wittmann, 2021 ). Phenomenologically, it has been suggested that the experienced present moment is actually occurring over a wider temporal window in which the contents of consciousness are integrated (Poppel, 1997 ; Kent et al, 2019 ; Kent and Wittmann, 2021 ).…”

“…Despite this, most theoretical frameworks for consciousness limit the temporal aspects of consciousness to a few hundred ms timescales (Northoff and Lamme, 2020 ; Kent and Wittmann, 2021 ). Phenomenologically, it has been suggested that the experienced present moment is actually occurring over a wider temporal window in which the contents of consciousness are integrated (Poppel, 1997 ; Kent et al, 2019 ; Kent and Wittmann, 2021 ). A large number of studies have shown that the brain’s spontaneous activity during conscious states, prior to an experimental stimulus, is relevant to the resulting conscious content (Northoff and Huang, 2017 ).…”