Peter van Inwagen on gratuitous evil

Kraay, Klaas J.

doi:10.1017/s0034412513000310

Cited by 6 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 39 publications

(66 reference statements)

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“…For example, Peterson (2008), Hasker (1992), andvan Inwagen (1995) argue that God and gratuitous evil are compossible. Kraay (2014) But also note that if our lives lack meaning, then our suffering is gratuitous. If our lives are ultimately meaningless, then any suffering we endure would be meaningless too (for if our suffering had meaning, then our lives would as well).…”

Section: If God Exists Then Our Lives Have Meaningmentioning

confidence: 99%

God, the meaning of life, and a new argument for atheism

Megill

Linford

2015

Int J Philos Relig

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We raise various puzzles about the relationship between God (if God exists) and the meaning of life (if life has meaning). These difficulties suggest that, even if we assume that God exists, and even if (as we argue) God's existence would entail that our lives have meaning, God is not and could not be the source of the meaning of life. We conclude by discussing implications of our arguments: (i) these claims can be used in a novel argument for atheism; (ii) these claims undermine an extant argument for God's existence; and (iii) they suggest that atheism is consistent with our lives having meaning.

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Section: If God Exists Then Our Lives Have Meaningmentioning

confidence: 99%

God, the meaning of life, and a new argument for atheism

Megill

Linford

2015

Int J Philos Relig

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“…Consequently, God is in an Ever Better Case: for every world God can create (with G in it), there is at least one better (cf. Kraay : 402; : 227). In such a case, it is plausible that God can appropriately choose a world with some arbitrarily high value.…”

Section: Satisficing and Gratuitous Evilmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Various objections have been raised against van Inwagen's argument, but we are focused solely on Kraay's (2013;2014) complaint that van Inwagen illegitimately assumes that satisficing can be appropriate. I argue that van Inwagen is not committed to satisficing, but only to motivated submaximization.…”

Section: Satisficing and Gratuitous Evilmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Three prominent theistic replies to such objections assume that God can knowingly reject better worlds for ones that are good enough. Consequently, it is becoming popular to hold that these replies are committed to the claim that God can satisfice (e.g., Slote 1984: 152, nt 10;and Langtry 2008: 74-8;Kraay 2013Kraay , 2014and Dragos 2013). Since God is perfect, if God can satisfice, then satisficing can be appropriate (i.e.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion)

Tucker

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

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In replying to certain objections to the existence of God, Robert Adams, Bruce Langtry, and Peter van Inwagen assume that God can appropriately choose a suboptimal world, a world less good than some other world God could have chosen. A number of philosophers, such as Michael Slote and Klaas Kraay, claim that these theistic replies are therefore committed to the claim that satisficing can be appropriate. Kraay argues that this commitment is a significant liability. I argue, however, that the relevant defenses of theism are committed to the appropriateness of, not satisficing, but motivated submaximization. When one submaximizes with motivation, one aims at the optimum but accepts the good enough because of a countervailing consideration. When one satisfices, one aims at the good enough and chooses the good enough because it realizes her aim at the good enough. While commitment to the appropriateness of satisficing may be a significant liability, commitment to the appropriateness of motivated submaximization is not.

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“…Kraay (‘Peter van Inwagen on Gratuitous Evil’) anticipates this move, and Jordan (‘The No Minimum Argument and Satisficing: A Reply to Dragos') explicitly makes it.…”

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confidence: 99%

God and gratuitous evil (Part II)

Kraay

2016

Philosophy Compass

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In contemporary analytic philosophy, the problem of evil refers to a family of arguments that attempt to show, by appeal to evil, that God does not (or probably does not) exist. Some very important arguments in this family focus on gratuitous evil. Most participants in the relevant discussions, including theists and atheists, agree that God is able to prevent all gratuitous evil, and that God would do so. On this view, of course, the occurrence of even a single instance of gratuitous evil falsifies theism. The most common response to such arguments attempts to cast doubt on the claim that gratuitous evil really occurs. The focus of these two survey papers will be a different response – one that has received less attention in the literature. This response attempts to show that God and gratuitous evil are compatible. If it succeeds, then the occurrence of gratuitous evil does not, after all, count against theism. In the prequel to this paper, I surveyed the literature surrounding the attempts by Michael Peterson and John Hick to execute this strategy. Here, I survey the attempts due to William Hasker, Peter van Inwagen, and Michael Almeida, respectively.

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Peter van Inwagen on gratuitous evil

Cited by 6 publications

References 39 publications

God, the meaning of life, and a new argument for atheism

God, the meaning of life, and a new argument for atheism

Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion)

God and gratuitous evil (Part II)

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