Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion)

Abstract

In replying to certain objections to the existence of God, Robert Adams, Bruce Langtry, and Peter van Inwagen assume that God can appropriately choose a suboptimal world, a world less good than some other world God could have chosen. A number of philosophers, such as Michael Slote and Klaas Kraay, claim that these theistic replies are therefore committed to the claim that satisficing can be appropriate. Kraay argues that this commitment is a significant liability. I argue, however, that the relevant defenses of theism are committed to the appropriateness of, not satisficing, but motivated submaximization. When one submaximizes with motivation, one aims at the optimum but accepts the good enough because of a countervailing consideration. When one satisfices, one aims at the good enough and chooses the good enough because it realizes her aim at the good enough. While commitment to the appropriateness of satisficing may be a significant liability, commitment to the appropriateness of motivated submaximization is not.

Is motivated submaximization good enough for God?

“…I won't rehearse these here, but if my arguments succeed, it is not clear that Adams – or anyone else, for that matter – can rely on divine satisficing to resist (1) after all. Chris Tucker (2016) agrees with me that, given the present state of the literature, the appeal to divine satisficing is at best underdeveloped 9 . But Tucker also claims that Adams shouldn't be construed as relying on satisficing in the first place.…”

“…Chris Tucker (2016) agrees with me that appealing to divine satisficing is not a promising way to respond to either the argument from suboptimality or the problem of no best world. But he also argues that I am mistaken to think that the responses described in the first two sections of this article actually invoke satisficing.…”

“…Then, in the following section, I introduce Tucker's account of motivated submaximization. Officially, Tucker does not aim to show that the appeal to motivated submaximization can defeat either argument for atheism; his goal is primarily exegetical (Tucker (2016), 139). But, of course, the philosophical question that ultimately matters is whether motivated submaximization can indeed defeat these arguments.…”

“…As noted above, I have recently argued against the coherence and propriety of divine satisficing. In response, Chris Tucker (2016) has urged that responses like Langtry's should not be understood to invoke satisficing , but rather motivated submaximization . If Tucker is right, then my criticisms miss the mark.…”

God and gratuitous evil (Part II)

“…Tucker shares Kraay's worries about satisficing, but argues that it is a mistake to treat van Inwagen's argument as invoking this notion (137ff). Instead, Tucker argues, van Inwagen actually appeals to motivated submaximization . According to Tucker, the satisficer aims to promote the good to some suboptimal degree purely for its own sake.…”