Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games

Andersson, Ola; Galizzi, Matteo M.; Hoppe, Tim; Kranz, Sebastian; Wiel, Karen van der; Wengström, Erik

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2010.03.011

Cited by 29 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Both "cheap talk" (Xiao and Houser, 2005;Zultan, 2012) and potential deception over private information aspects in the game (Boles et al, 2000;Croson et al, 2003;Lusk and Hudson, 2004;Koning et al, 2011) have been analyzed. Examples for the first form are persuasion and non-binding requests (Rankin, 2003;Andersson et al, 2010). Kriss et al (forthcoming) compare explicit deception (lies about the pie size) and implicit deception (through actions) in an ultimatum game with asymmetric information on the pie size.…”

Section: (Pre-play) Communication and Messagesmentioning

confidence: 99%

More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature

Güth

Kocher²

2014

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

328

202

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Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is an extremely versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.Keywords: ultimatum bargaining, experiment, social preferences. JEL classification: C91 This version: 21 August 2013* When Güth presented the more recent ultimatum-like experiments, Uri Gneezy suggested writing a survey of more than 30 years of ultimatum bargaining research. We thank him for the nudge and David Bauder as well as Niklas Garnadt for excellent research assistance. We are extremely grateful to the magnificent members of the Economic Science Association Discussion List; many of them -too many to mention each by namepointed us to scholarly papers that use the ultimatum game. All remaining errors and omissions are of course ours. §

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Section: (Pre-play) Communication and Messagesmentioning

confidence: 99%

More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature

Güth

Kocher²

2014

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

328

202

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Adding a round of face-to-face communication before offers are made results in near perfect rates of agreement (Roth 1995). Typed messages-the sort of communication also used in our experiments-does not improve efficiency as much but still improves upon no communication (Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann 2003, Andersson et al 2010, Zultan 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 74%

Communication in vertical markets: Experimental evidence

Möllers¹,

Normann²,

Snyder

2017

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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When an upstream monopolist supplies several competing downstream firms, it may fail to monopolize the market because it is unable to commit not to behave opportunistically. We build on previous experimental studies of this well-known commitment problem by introducing communication. Allowing the upstream firm to chat privately with each downstream firm reduces total offered quantity from near the Cournot level (observed in the absence of communication) halfway toward the monopoly level. Allowing all three firms to chat together openly results in complete monopolization. Downstream firms obtain such a bargaining advantage from open communication that all of the gains from monopolizing the market accrue to them. A simple structural model of Nash bargaining fits the pattern of shifting surpluses well. We conclude with a discussion of the antitrust implications of open communication in vertical markets.

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“…(), ultimatum bargaining constitutes a laboratory analogue of real‐world transactions with take‐it‐or leave‐it offers. While cheap talk messages from proposers to responders (Rankin, ) and vice versa (Andersson et al ., ) have been studied in the context of ultimatum experiments, communication among respondents has not been studied so far. We undertake this task, using the analogy between non‐binding communication among respondents and a cheap talk TU providing a coordination device for workers engaging in decentralized transactions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%