Pcoins for parking: a field experiment with tradable mobility permits

Abstract

With congestion being one of the most important externalities in transportation, it remains important to investigate effective and politically feasible solutions for it. We have conducted an 8-week experiment with tradable mobility permits, specifically applied to the use of parking facilities at a Dutch employer. We combine actual mobility behaviour with trading behaviour and survey responses of participants and non-participating employees of the same company. We have analysed the choice to participate in a voluntary experiment, and the behavioural response to tradable permits. Our results provide suggestive evidence that active participants do adjust their behaviour as intended. Furthermore, participation takes less time than people anticipate, and permits are viewed as a fairer and better functioning alternative to paid parking. * We would like to gratefully acknowledge ANWB and Innovactory in general, and Geordie Kooiman and Stefan Bollars in specific, for the collaboration in organizing the experiment.

Modelling a tradable transport permit scheme using system dynamics

“…The increase in permit price over the initial period until an equilibrium point is reached corresponds with behaviour observed in the only "in-the-field" tradable transport permit experiment that we are aware of (Brands et al, 2021). Although our baseline did not include any permit selling (other than excess bank permits), the rising price is comparative as there is net buying in the scheme until equilibrium.…”

“…In short, when deciding on the policy target, all options raise issues of monitoring and enforcement (see Section 2.3 Trading Rules), partially due to their spatial and temporal nature, but also through difficulties due to data collection. One option for overcoming this could be through smartphone applications (Brands et al, 2021).…”

Combining Tradable Credit Schemes with a New Form of Road Pricing: Producing Liveable Cities and Meeting Decarbonisation Goals

“…(E7) Historically, the implementation of road user charging, such as congestion charging, has met with strong public opposition. Charging for driving during rush hour in a particular zone or on a particular road or motorway has the disadvantage, in that there is often little social or political support for it [8].…”

“…It also provides the opportunity for authorities to pursue distributional outcomes by means of credit allocation and so could be used to support car-dependent low-income households [19]. The actual distribution of costs and benefits can be manipulated by credit allocation, offering an easy and natural way of providing a subsidy to specific groups of road users [8]. However, it is acknowledged that it will be the policy behind the allocation of credits, which will determine the impact on access to transport for particular groups.…”

“…Swapping fuel duty for road pricing does not automatically mitigate the congestion and pollution caused by high road traffic or address existing transport inequities. Transport researchers can, however, provide quantitative experimental evidence that schemes such as tradable credit schemes (TCS) have the potential to reduce road user demand and ease congestion in a cost-neutral manner, which may be more acceptable to the public [8]. TCS refer to an allocation of transferable free credits or permits to all road users to undertake trips or to travel miles.…”