¿Pavimentando con votos? Apropiación presupuestal para proyectos de infraestructura vial en Colombia, 2002-2006

Guinand, Luis Bernardo Mejía; Botero, Felipe; Raga, Juan Carlos Rodríguez

doi:10.7440/colombiaint68.2008.01

Cited by 11 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 13 publications

(12 reference statements)

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“…Likewise, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) find that in Spanish municipalities, grants to co-partisans led to some political support while grants to opposition parties did not bring in more votes. However, a number of studies also support a contrary hypothesis that grants tend to be directed toward jurisdictions with a high number of swing voters as means of winning support (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987;Dixit and Londregan 1998;Johansson 2003;Mejía Guinand, Botero, and Rodríguez Raga 2009;Dahlberg and Johansson 2002). The plausibility of both hypotheses calls for further testing.…”

Section: Chief Executives' Networking Activitymentioning

confidence: 80%

Government Performance and Chief Executives’ Intangible Assets: Motives, Networking, and/or Capacity?

Avellaneda

2015

Public Management Review

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This study explores the impact of chief executives' intangible assets -motives, capacity and networks -on government performance. Three main hypotheses suggesting a direct relationship between these assets and performance are tested using data from municipalities in El Salvador, where the chief executive is the elected mayor. The research involved an in-field survey of 135 Salvadorian mayors (out of 262) and data collected from national agencies, focusing on two dimensions of municipal performance: service delivery (electricity and running water) and expansion of revenue (with national grants). After controlling for municipal and constituent-level factors, findings indicate that the chief executive's capacity (specifically mayoral expertise) is positively correlated to municipal delivery of electricity and running water; intrinsic motivation is linked to expansion of water services; and municipalities whose chief executives are nationally networked tend to receive more grant monies. This study contributes to the literature on government performance by assessing the role of chief executives' intangible assets in the developing context of a relatively newly established democracy in Latin America.Public Management Review, 2015 http://dx.

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Section: Chief Executives' Networking Activitymentioning

confidence: 80%

Government Performance and Chief Executives’ Intangible Assets: Motives, Networking, and/or Capacity?

Avellaneda

2015

Public Management Review

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“…In the case of Colombia, qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that local roads investments are strongly determined by political, rather than technical criteria. For instance, Mejía-Guinand et al (2008) show that, between 2002 and 2006, road investment were targeted by the Consejos Comunales, populist meetings held by the President in which resources were assigned on a discretionary basis. Since then, there have been numerous corruption and clientelism scandals involving local road investments financed with subnational tranfers.…”

Section: Figure 3 Municipal Road Investments By Source Of Financingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political alignment in the time of weak parties : electoral advantages and subnational transfers in Colombia

Bonilla‐Mejía¹,

Higuera-Mendieta²

2017

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This paper explores the effect of alignment between local and national politics in a context of weak parties. Based on a regression discontinuity design in close elections, we find that, in absence of strong parties, presidential coalitions become the focal point of political alignment in Colombia. In fact, while parties provide almost no electoral advantages to their members, candidates aspiring to national positions get significantly more votes in municipalities governed by mayors aligned with the incoming presidential coalitions. In turn, aligned mayors receive additional discretionary transfers from the National Government to finance road investments. These discretionary transfers, however, do not translate into local economic growth. ResumenEste documento explora el efecto de alineación entre politicos locales y nacionales en un contexto de partidos débiles. Utilizando métodos de regresión discontinua en elecciones reñidas, encontramos que en ausencia de partidos fuertes, las coaliciones presidenciales se convierten en los ejes de la alineación política en Colombia. De hecho, mientras que los partidos políticos proveen muy pocas ventajas electorales a sus miembros, los candidatos de la coalición a posiciones nacionales obtienen muchos más votos en municipios gobernados por alcaldes alineados. A su vez, los alcaldes alineados reciben más transferencias discrecionales para financiar carreteras por parte del gobierno nacional. Estas transferencias, sin embargo, no se traducen en mayor crecimiento económico en los municipios.Palabras clave: Alineación política, elcciones, transferencias subnacionales, regresión discontinua Clasificaciión JEL: D72, H72, H77, R11 3 The Regional Development and Regional Compensation Funds account for at least 40% of the royalties and prioritizes high impact projects in the poorest regions. Resources are allocated by regional committees,Órganos Colegiados de Administración y Decisión (OCAD), in which national and local officers evaluate and select the projects. 4 There is a long tradition of discretionary transfers in Colombia. Co-financing funds are among the most recent ones, replacing the Auxilios Parlamentarios, parliamentary funds that were eliminated in 1991 in an attempt to eradicate pork-barrel politics Brun and Diamond (2014); Cárdenas et al. (2006). 7

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“…Yet, these explanations have neglected the fact that the administrative fiscal and political decentralization reforms constrain and outline the distribution of private property to citizens by local politicians and the ability of national parties to influence local politics. 1 These reforms can influence the transformations of competition, as other research has explored (Dargent & Muñoz, 2011;Mejía Guinand et al, 2008).…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Rethinking political competition: Contracts and nationally located linkages in Colombian municipalities (1988–2015)

Uribe

2022

Latin American Policy

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At the end of the twentieth century, Latin American states began processes of transition and democratic expansion. Two decades later, these processes seem to have been partially achieved through mostly competitive subnational governments in the region. Yet, some countries still show uncompetitive elections and restrictions to local and regional power. This study shows how the interaction between political and administrative decentralization conditions and competition vary in Colombian local municipalities. Using local electoral data and local numbers of contractors, it reveals that politicians at the national level and the number of local contractors are positively related to higher levels of political competition. These results evidence the importance of national political variables and show how administrative decentralization affects local electoral competition.

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¿Pavimentando con votos? Apropiación presupuestal para proyectos de infraestructura vial en Colombia, 2002-2006

Cited by 11 publications

References 13 publications

Government Performance and Chief Executives’ Intangible Assets: Motives, Networking, and/or Capacity?

Government Performance and Chief Executives’ Intangible Assets: Motives, Networking, and/or Capacity?

Political alignment in the time of weak parties : electoral advantages and subnational transfers in Colombia

Rethinking political competition: Contracts and nationally located linkages in Colombian municipalities (1988–2015)

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