Political alignment in the time of weak parties : electoral advantages and subnational transfers in Colombia

Abstract

This paper explores the effect of alignment between local and national politics in a context of weak parties. Based on a regression discontinuity design in close elections, we find that, in absence of strong parties, presidential coalitions become the focal point of political alignment in Colombia. In fact, while parties provide almost no electoral advantages to their members, candidates aspiring to national positions get significantly more votes in municipalities governed by mayors aligned with the incoming presidential coalitions. In turn, aligned mayors receive additional discretionary transfers from the National Government to finance road investments. These discretionary transfers, however, do not translate into local economic growth. ResumenEste documento explora el efecto de alineación entre politicos locales y nacionales en un contexto de partidos débiles. Utilizando métodos de regresión discontinua en elecciones reñidas, encontramos que en ausencia de partidos fuertes, las coaliciones presidenciales se convierten en los ejes de la alineación política en Colombia. De hecho, mientras que los partidos políticos proveen muy pocas ventajas electorales a sus miembros, los candidatos de la coalición a posiciones nacionales obtienen muchos más votos en municipios gobernados por alcaldes alineados. A su vez, los alcaldes alineados reciben más transferencias discrecionales para financiar carreteras por parte del gobierno nacional. Estas transferencias, sin embargo, no se traducen en mayor crecimiento económico en los municipios.Palabras clave: Alineación política, elcciones, transferencias subnacionales, regresión discontinua Clasificaciión JEL: D72, H72, H77, R11 3 The Regional Development and Regional Compensation Funds account for at least 40% of the royalties and prioritizes high impact projects in the poorest regions. Resources are allocated by regional committees,Órganos Colegiados de Administración y Decisión (OCAD), in which national and local officers evaluate and select the projects. 4 There is a long tradition of discretionary transfers in Colombia. Co-financing funds are among the most recent ones, replacing the Auxilios Parlamentarios, parliamentary funds that were eliminated in 1991 in an attempt to eradicate pork-barrel politics Brun and Diamond (2014); Cárdenas et al. (2006). 7

Transitions for whom? Political alignment and subsidies for solar energy projects in rural Colombian municipalities

“…The RDD employed in this article leads to the conclusion that political alignment between local governments and the national government benefits Colombian ZNI municipalities. In line with other research on subnational transfers in Colombia (Bolduc et al, 2019;Bonilla-Mejía et al, 2017), I find that aligned municipalities received approximately U.S.$256 per capita more for the development of small-scale solar energy projects than nonaligned ones. In substantive terms, this amount equals 15% of the GDP per capita in poor rural departments of Colombia such as Vaupés (DANE, 2020b).…”

“…The two traditional parties, Liberal and Conservative, lost a significant part of their political power, while new parties proliferated. In fact, elected mayors from the two traditional parties fell from 88.4% in 1990 to 33.5% in 2015 (Bonilla-Mejía et al, 2017). The transition to a multiparty system was characterized by the emergence of a several new parties, a situation that has severely deinstitutionalized and weakened the party system.…”

“…In practice, presidents in Colombia decide to allocate transfers to aligned municipalities-whether copartisan or within the electoral coalition (Bolduc et al, 2019). In return, candidates aspiring to national positions get significantly more votes in municipalities governed by mayors aligned with the incoming presidential coalitions (Bonilla-Mejía et al, 2017).…”

Notas sobre la Economía Política del Caribe Colombiano

“…En efecto, la pobre institucionalidad en las regiones genera importantes ventajas para la clase política nacional, lo que empodera a lasélites locales y mina el desarrollo de sus instituciones. La evidencia tiende a confirmar esto, al mostrar que existen en Colombia intercambios activos de favores, por ejemplo entre transferencias subnacionales y apoyo legislativo y electoral (Cárdenas et al, 2006;Ocampo, 2014;Chaves et al, 2015;Bonilla y Higuera, 2017). El debate, que no es nuevo, se ha enfocado en loś ultimos años en el uso de la mermelada, de la cual la región Caribe ha sido una de las grandes receptoras.…”

Oil booms and subnational public investment: a case-study for Colombia

“…Consistent with this argument the lower levels of public investment were in 2008, 2012 and 2016, in which local elections took place. 9Supporting this assumption,Bonilla and Higuera (2017) found larger transfers from the national government to municipalities where mayors belong to the President's political party, suggesting a potential link between transfers and the electoral cycle. This cyclical behaviour has two potential sources.…”