Rethinking political competition: Contracts and nationally located linkages in Colombian municipalities (1988–2015)

Abstract

At the end of the twentieth century, Latin American states began processes of transition and democratic expansion. Two decades later, these processes seem to have been partially achieved through mostly competitive subnational governments in the region. Yet, some countries still show uncompetitive elections and restrictions to local and regional power. This study shows how the interaction between political and administrative decentralization conditions and competition vary in Colombian local municipalities. Using local electoral data and local numbers of contractors, it reveals that politicians at the national level and the number of local contractors are positively related to higher levels of political competition. These results evidence the importance of national political variables and show how administrative decentralization affects local electoral competition.

Competencia sin alternancia en las gobernaciones colombianas: los dominios electorales en la democracia subnacional colombiana. Un análisis más allá de los partidos políticos

“…En primer lugar, la teoría de la interacción estratégica muestra que los gobernantes regionales con más conexiones nacionales tienen mayor posibilidad de consolidar su po der local (Pino, 2022). Estas conexiones se midieron como el número de senadores que pertenecen a dichas estructuras.…”