2013
DOI: 10.1111/spc3.12075
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On The Nature of Experiencing Self‐Agency: The Role of Goals and Primes in Inferring Oneself as the Cause of Behavior

Abstract: People often find themselves in situations where the cause of events may be ambiguous. Surprisingly though, the experience of self-agency, i.e., perceiving oneself as the causal agent of behavioral outcomes, appears quite natural to most people. How then do these experiences arise? We discuss common models proposing that self-agency experiences result from the comparison between actual action-outcomes and the outcomes one explicitly set as a goal. However, recent developments in psychology and neuroscience sug… Show more

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Cited by 15 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Hence, it will also be important to investigate long-term effects of these types of interventions ( Albarracin and Wyer, 2001 ). This long-term effect could be enhanced by giving people a sense of agency (i.e., allowing people to perceive themselves as the causal agents of behavioral outcomes) which could motivate them further to achieve a sustainable goal ( van der Weiden et al, 2013 ).…”
Section: Further Considerationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, it will also be important to investigate long-term effects of these types of interventions ( Albarracin and Wyer, 2001 ). This long-term effect could be enhanced by giving people a sense of agency (i.e., allowing people to perceive themselves as the causal agents of behavioral outcomes) which could motivate them further to achieve a sustainable goal ( van der Weiden et al, 2013 ).…”
Section: Further Considerationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In situations with multiple possible outcomes and multiple possible agents, motor predictions regarding the actual outcome can no longer reliably guide feelings of self-agency and consequently, retrospective cognitive inferences of agency become important (Aarts et al, 2005;van der Weiden et al, 2013a;Wegner, 2002). The cognitive inference model assumes that people infer self-agency based on knowledge and beliefs regarding the effects (e.g., laughter) of their actions (e.g., making a joke) before they perform them, and regarding the influence of other factors (e.g., someone who is imitating you in a funny way).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Building on the notion that belief in free will often co-occurs with the pursuit of goal-directed behavior, Aarts and van den Bos (2011) tested the possibility that free will beliefs are associated with implicit processing of action-outcome relations underlying goal-directed behavior. The authors compared participants with either strong or weak dispositional free will beliefs in two different tasks that tapped into implicit aspects of agentic experience: (1) an intentional binding task, which measures the perceptual attraction of an intentional action and its sensory outcomes in terms of time, and (2) an action-outcome priming task, which assesses agency inferences resulting from a match between primed and actual outcomes (see Moore and Obhi, 2012 ; van der Weiden et al, 2013 ; for reviews). Aarts and van den Bos (2011) found that strong dispositional free will beliefs were associated with greater intentional binding and a stronger influence of primes on agency inferences.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%