Gilles de la Tourette syndrome (GTS) is characterized by motor and phonic tics. It is unknown how paying attention to one's own tics might modulate tic frequency. We determined tic frequency in freely ticcing GTS patients while they were being filmed. In Study 1, we investigated 12 patients (1) alone in a room (baseline); (2) alone in front of a mirror. In Study 2, we replicated these conditions in 16 patients and additionally examined how watching a video, in which the individual was shown not ticcing, affected their tic frequency. In both studies, tic frequency was significantly higher when patients watched themselves in a mirror compared to baseline. In contrast, tic frequency was significantly reduced in the video condition. Paying attention to one's own tics increases tic frequency when tics are not suppressed and appears to be specific for attention to tics, rather than attention to the self.

No abstract

The inferior frontal junction (IFJ) area, a small region in the posterior lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), has received increasing interest in recent years due to its central involvement in the control of action, attention, and memory. Yet, both its function and anatomy remain controversial. Here, we employed a meta-analytic parcellation of the left LPFC to show that the IFJ can be isolated based on its specific functional connections. A seed region, oriented along the left inferior frontal sulcus (IFS), was subdivided via cluster analyses of voxel-wise whole-brain co-activation patterns. The ensuing clusters were characterized by their unique connections, the functional profiles of associated experiments, and an independent topic mapping approach. A cluster at the posterior end of the IFS matched previous descriptions of the IFJ in location and extent and could be distinguished from a more caudal cluster involved in motor control, a more ventral cluster involved in linguistic processing, and 3 more rostral clusters involved in other aspects of cognitive control. Overall, our findings highlight that the IFJ constitutes a core functional unit within the frontal lobe and delineate its borders. Implications for the IFJ's role in human cognition and the organizational principles of the frontal lobe are discussed.

The question of how we can voluntarily control our behaviour dates back to the beginnings of scientific psychology. Currently, there are two empirical research disciplines tackling human volition: cognitive neuroscience and social psychology. To date, there is little interaction between the two disciplines in terms of the investigation of human volition. The aim of the current article is to highlight recent brain imaging work on human volition and to relate social psychological concepts of volition to the functional neuroanatomy of intentional action. A host of studies indicate that the medial prefrontal cortex plays a crucial role in voluntary action. Accordingly, we postulate that social psychological concepts of volition can be investigated using neuroimaging techniques, and propose that by developing a social cognitive neuroscience of human volition, we may gain a deeper understanding of this fascinating and complex aspect of the human mind.

Weakening belief in the concept of free will yields pronounced effects upon social behavior, typically promoting selfish and aggressive over pro-social and helping tendencies. Belief manipulations have furthermore been shown to modulate basic and unconscious processes involved in motor control and self-regulation. Yet, to date, it remains unclear how high-level beliefs can impact such a wide range of behaviors. Here, we tested the hypothesis that priming disbelief in free will diminishes the sense of agency, i.e., the intrinsic sensation of being in control of one’s own actions. To this end, we measured participants’ implicit and explicit self-agency under both anti-free will and control conditions. Priming disbelief in free will reduced implicit but not explicit components of agency. These findings suggest that free will beliefs have a causal impact on the pre-reflective feeling of being in control of one’s actions, and solidify previous proposals that implicit and explicit agency components tap into distinct facets of action awareness.