Responding optimally with unknown sources of evidence (ROUSE) is a theory of short-term priming applied to associative, orthographic-phonemic, and repetition priming. In our studies, perceptual identification is measured with two-alternative forced-choice testing. ROUSE assumes features activated by primes are confused with those activated by the target. A near-optimal decision discounts evidence arising from such shared features. Too little discounting explains the finding that primed words were preferred after passive viewing of primes. Too much discounting explains the findings of reverse preference after active processing of primes. These preference changes highlight the need to use paradigms (like the present ones) capable of separating preferential and perceptual components of priming. Evidence of enhanced perception was found only with associative priming and was very small in magnitude compared with preference effects.

In a series of suboptimal priming studies, it was shown that both affective and nonaffective reactions to a stimulus may occur without awareness. Moreover, it was demonstrated that affective information is detected earlier than nonaffective information. Therefore, early reactions to an affect-laden stimulus (e.g., a smiling man) are cognitively unappraised and thus diffuse (e.g., "positive"), whereas later affective reactions can be more specific and distinct (e.g., "a smiling man"). Through variations of prime exposure (extremely short, moderately short) the impact of early diffuse and late distinct affect on judgment was investigated. Findings show that distinctness (and prime-target similarity) is an essential determinant of whether the effect of affect is null, assimilation, or contrast. Furthermore, whether affect priming activates diffuse or distinct reactions is a matter of a fraction of seconds.

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The sense of self-agency is a pervasive experience that people infer from their actions and the outcomes they produce. Recent research suggests that self-agency inferences arise from an explicit goal-directed process as well as an implicit outcome-priming process. Three experiments examined potential differences between these 2 processes. Participants had the goal to produce an outcome or were primed with the outcome. Next, they performed an action in an agency-ambiguous situation, followed by an outcome that matched or mismatched the goal or prime, and indicated experienced self-agency over the action-outcome. Results showed that goals reduce self-agency over mismatching outcomes. However, outcome-primes did not affect self-agency over mismatching outcomes but even enhanced self-agency over mismatching proximate outcomes. Goals and outcome-primes equally enhanced self-agency for matches. Our findings provide novel evidence that self-agency experiences result from 2 distinct inferential routes and that goals and primes differentially affect the perception of our own behavior.