O que revelam os estudos realizados no Brasil sobre política de dividendos?

Martins, Andressa Iovine; Famá, Rubéns

doi:10.1590/s0034-75902012000100003

Cited by 25 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 17 publications

(3 reference statements)

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“…Ante a esta e às demais particularidades existentes quanto à forma de distribuição de lucros aos acionistas no país, incluindo a existência de juros sobre capital próprio 1 Alves, 2015), a diferenciação de ações em ordinárias e preferenciais (Martins;Famá, 2012, Gorga, 2004) e a concentração acionária (Guimarães;Marques;Peixoto, 2014 e Sonza;Kloeckner, 2014), os estudos internacionais se tornam pouco aderentes ao contexto brasileiro.…”

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Efeitos Da Governança Corporativa Na Distribuição De Dividendos: Um Estudo Em Empresas Brasileiras

Souza¹,

Peixoto²,

Santos³

2016

ASAA Journal

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Resumo: Esta pesquisa analisou a relação que a governança corporativa tem na distribuição de dividendos de empresas brasileiras de capital aberto não financeiras. Para tanto foram coletados e analisados dados de companhias brasileiras não financeiras listadas na BM&F Bovespa, no período de 2002 a 2013. Para a análise, utilizou-se de regressão com dados em painel Pooled-OLS. A hipótese levantada parte das teorias de agência e do pássaro na mão e sugere-se que haja relação positiva entre a qualidade da governança corporativa das empresas (GC), classificada pela BM&F Bovespa, e o montante de dividendos que as empresas distribuem aos seus acionistas. Os resultados encontrados mostraram que empresas com melhores práticas de governança corporativa pagam dividendos maiores do que aquelas com práticas de governança incipientes, que períodos de crise não influenciaram na forma de distribuição de dividendos e que alguns setores apresentaram significância estatística positiva na distribuição de dividendos. Para trabalhos futuros, sugere-se a análise individual da remuneração aos acionistas via dividendos ou por meio de juros sobre capital próprio, bem como análise dos quatro níveis de GC em separado, o uso de outras proxies para governança e o uso de métodos econométricos distintos para avaliar as variáveis de interesse.Palavras-chave: Governança corporativa. Dividendos. Crise.

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Efeitos Da Governança Corporativa Na Distribuição De Dividendos: Um Estudo Em Empresas Brasileiras

Souza¹,

Peixoto²,

Santos³

2016

ASAA Journal

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“…The authors point out that in the case of investment funds, there is an additional advantage of an interest on equity payment: their tax rate is zero. The exact goal of our study is to model a lending transaction that originates from this difference in the way that taxes are imposed depending on the type of investor, thus contributing to closing the gap in the literature regarding this type of study, as pointed out by Martins and Famá (2012).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Uma Abordagem de Teoria dos Jogos sobre Operações de Aluguel no Mercado Acionário Brasileiro

Ardison

Costa

2014

Rev. contab. finanç.

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In Brazil's market, the institution of interest on equity transactions provides a precedent for gains resulting from the difference between the tax rates of individuals (natural person) and those of investment funds through structured transactions. This difference creates incentives to lend stock; on the eve of an interest payment on equity, individual investors lend their stock to investment funds, which receive the interest in full and return only 85% of its value to the investors. Our goal is to understand how the surplus generated in this tax arbitration is split among the agents involved in the stock-lending transaction and to determine whether there are conditions under which the agents would have no incentive to conduct such a transaction. Using a non-cooperative games approach, we have structured this transaction and analyzed possible subgame perfect Nash equilibriums in three situations: (1) a direct relationship between the investor and the investment fund and an absence of transaction costs; (2) a direct relationship between the investor and the investment fund and the presence of transaction costs; (3) a relationship between the investor and the investment fund through a broker and the presence of (lower) transaction costs. In the cases in which the broker does not mediate the relationship, more contracts tend to be signed, but the fund's gain will only cover the record-keeping costs of the transaction. This situation is reversed in the presence of high transaction costs: in extreme cases, the investor loses bargaining power and his/her gain compensates only for his/her risk aversion. When a broker is introduced into stock lending, only those investors who have a minimum amount of stock will receive offers from the fund through the broker. The fund's gain tends to decrease due to the broker's presence and in some situations, the investor loses bargaining power and accepts any contract that compensates for his/her risk aversion.

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“…11.638/2007), high private benefits of control that favor large controlling shareholders (Brandão & Crisóstomo, 2015;Dyck & Zingales, 2004;Holanda & Coelho, 2014;Procianoy & Verdi, 2009). Besides, some macroeconomic events also make dividend policy an interesting topic to be analyzed in Brazil: the drop in inflation, from 1994, and the process of poststabilization, the growth of stock market capitalization, and the importance given to the adoption by firms of good corporate governance practices (Moreiras, Tambosi Filho, & Garcia, 2012;Procianoy & Verdi, 2009 (Martins & Famá, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonfinancial Firms as Large Shareholder Use Dividend Policy for Management Monitoring in Brazil

Crisóstomo

Brandão

2018

FSRJ

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The paper analyzes whether nonfinancial firms as large blockholders of the Brazilian firm shape dividend policy. Under the Agency Theoretical framework a set of good corporate governance practices is suggested as able to control management activity and prevent managers from incurring in moral hazard problems and the emergence of excessive management power as predicted by the Managerial Power Hypothesis. In this context, the Management Monitoring Hypothesis proposes that dividend policy may be used as a management control mechanism given that dividend distribution affects the free cash flow available for managers.

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O que revelam os estudos realizados no Brasil sobre política de dividendos?

Cited by 25 publications

References 17 publications

Efeitos Da Governança Corporativa Na Distribuição De Dividendos: Um Estudo Em Empresas Brasileiras

Efeitos Da Governança Corporativa Na Distribuição De Dividendos: Um Estudo Em Empresas Brasileiras

Uma Abordagem de Teoria dos Jogos sobre Operações de Aluguel no Mercado Acionário Brasileiro

Nonfinancial Firms as Large Shareholder Use Dividend Policy for Management Monitoring in Brazil

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