“No-Saying” in Habermas

Abstract

Habermas’s paradigm of communicative action is usually taken to be pretty much dominated by consensus, “Yes-saying.” What if this were a radically one-sided perception? We take up this unorthodox position by arguing that “no-saying” in this paradigm is typically overlooked and underemphasized. To demonstrate this, we consider how negativity is figured at the most basic onto-ethical level in communicative action, as well as expressed in civil disobedience, a phenomenon to which Habermas assigns the remarkable role of “touchstone” ( Prufstein) of constitutional democracy. Once the importance of no-saying is drawn out, the paradigm looks distinctly less hostile to dissensus and agonism in democratic life.

Historical criticism without progress: Memory as an emancipatory resource for critical theory

“…This position also allows him to “validat[e] freedom's normative status for emancipatory political theory ” (Roberts, , p. 749) in a universalistic way based on the individual's “real interest in being free from domination”—that is, the freedom to disagree and literally “be heard” within the practices that sustain subjugation. While Habermas tends to draw on European examples, his recent emphasis on “no‐saying” (White & Farr )—that is, on the ability of repressed communities and individuals to speak against dominant narratives that “look ‘obvious’ far beyond the ground where they have originated” (Chakrabarty, , p. 43)—does potentially allow for universalistic narratives to be questioned “from below.” Despite its role in justifying colonialism (which he acknowledges), Habermas thus seeks to preserve the critical potential of the Enlightenment as an emancipatory project while also allowing it to be questioned from the margins. In this sense, his position is not unlike that of Dipesh Chakrabarty (), who wants simultaneously to “provincialize” universalistic European humanism while also acknowledging the fact that it is “indispensable” insofar as it “has historically provided a strong foundation on which to erect—both in Europe and outside—critiques of socially unjust practices” (p. 4).…”

O locus da gestão social no contexto das inter-relações e tensões entre mundo-da-vida (lebenswelt) e sistema (system)

“…Em contrapartida, é importante destacar que é central em Habermas o fato de ele manter a força democrática na formação da opinião por parte dos cidadãos e não somente em processos institucionais (SILVA; MACHADO; MELO, 2010). Além disso, segundo Kreide (2016), a democracia deliberativa não se forma em um encontro harmonioso, pois o poder comunicativo é também o poder de questionar por meio de atos de resistência, manifestações e protestos (KREIDE, 2016) -isso fica claro por meio das discussões de Habermas sobre protestos e desobediência civil (WHITE;FARR, 2012). Sobre a contraposição simplista entre Estado e sociedade civil, este texto procura avançar por meio de inter-relações e tensões.…”

“…Em parte, o livro Direito e democracia, de 1992, é uma resposta a seus críticos e atende a muitas dessas críticas (KELLY, 2004;WHITE;FARR, 2012;FLYNN, 2014;KREIDE, 2016). Aqui, argumentamos que as inter-relações e tensões entre mundo--da-vida e sistema possibilitam problematizar o locus da gestão social, defendendo com Flynn (2014, p. 213…”

The purest form of communicative power. A reinterpretation of the key to the legitimacy of norms in Habermas's model of democracy

“…Like Thomassen, they focus on the treatment that Habermas gives to cases of civil disobedience but deem it to be a clear no‐saying to the force of even deliberatively justified law. This, they say, discredits the image of the communicative paradigm as being “monologically driven by consensus” (White & Farr, ). For my part, however, I believe this way of formulating the problem is mistaken.…”