Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: Japanese-U.S. Relations, 1938-1941

Hosoya, Chihiro

doi:10.1177/002234336800500201

Cited by 15 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Japan's leaders opted for war only after they were persuaded that the military balance between themselves and their adversaries would never again be as favorable as it was in 1941; time was working against them. They were also convinced that they could not attain their objectives by diplomacy (Borg & Okamoto, 1973;Butow, 1961;Hosoya, 1968;Ienaga, 1978;Ike, 1967;Russett, 1967).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Deterrence

Lebow

Stein

1987

Journal of Social Issues

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Part I of this essay reviews cases of deterrence failure and assesses the political, psychological, and practical obstacles to the success of deterrence. The evidence suggests that the utility of deterrence is limited to a narrow range of cases. It is appropriate only when leaders are motivated largely by ' 'opportunity" rather than by "need," have the political freedom to exercise restraint, are not misled by grossly distorted assessments of the political-military situation, and are vulnerable to the kind of threats a deterrer can make. Deterrence must also be practiced early on, before an adversary commits itself to a challenge and becomes correspondingly insensitive to warnings that its action is likely to meet with retaliation. Unless these conditions are met, deterrence will at most be ineffective and at worst counterproductive. Part I1 examines deterrence successes and those cases where deterrence might have succeeded had it been attempted. A case-by-case review makes it apparent that there are few unambiguous examples of the success of deterrence. Inevitably, proponents of deterrence resort to counte$actual reasoning to allege that deterrence would have worked had it been tried. A review of these arguments suggests that they too are frequently open to multiple interpretation. Because the evidence of success is ambiguous and because deterrence can be ineffective, uncertain, and risky, it must be supplemented by other strategies of conflict management. Part III looks beyond deterrence to strategies of "reassurance" that might substitute for or complement deterrence and reduce some of its obvious risks. Strategies of reassurance presume ongoing hostility but, unlike deterrence, root the source of that

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Deterrence

Lebow

Stein

1987

Journal of Social Issues

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“…Formally, the United States was unable to impose an embargo on Japan, since the two countries had signed in 1911 the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation guaranteeing that both parties “shall have liberty freely to come with their ships and cargoes to all places, ports and rivers in the territories of the other which are or may be opened to foreign commerce” (US Department of State 1918:316). However, continued aggression in China and Japanese attacks on American vessels and property led the Department of State during mid‐1938 to consider imposing economic sanctions against Japan (Hosoya 1968:98; Neu 1975:160). In July 1939, under a pretext that the American administration was conducting an overall survey of its commercial treaties, Secretary of State Hull notified the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that “the Government of the United States… gives notice hereby of its desire that this treaty, together with its accompanying protocol, expire 6 months from this date” (US Department of State 1943b:189).…”

Section: From the Stimson Doctrine To The Scrap Metal And Oil Embargomentioning

confidence: 99%

Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy: Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period

Saltzman

2011

Foreign Policy Analysis

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Saltzman, Ilai Z. (2011) Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy: Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/j.1743‐8594.2011.00146.x In an attempt to increase the legitimacy and traction of soft balancing in contemporary International Relations (IR) scholarship, and in order to rebuff critiques of its applicability, the concept is further clarified and applied to examine American foreign policy vis‐à‐vis Japan in the interwar period. Analysis reveals that soft balancing is not only a legitimate explanation, but also explains a major historical and theoretical puzzle—American grand strategy vis‐à‐vis Japan in interwar period—it shows that the concept is also applicable to account for patterns in non‐unipolar systems.

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“…Hosoya (1968) describes the sequence of increasingly stiff U.S. sanctions on Japan -the licensing of aviation gasoline and certain forms of iron and steel scrap in July 1940, the total embargo of iron and steel scrap exports in September 1940, and the complete embargo on oil exports in August 1941 -that strengthened the hardliners in Japan and propelled them toward war.17 This was part of a trip in which Hitler also met with the French and Italian leaders.…”

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confidence: 99%

An Elephant in the Garden: The Allies, Spain, and Oil in World War II

Caruana¹,

Rockoff²

2006

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During World War II the Allies controlled Spain's oil supply in order to limit Spain's support for the Axis. This experiment with sanctions is unusually informative because a wide range of policies was tried over a long period. Three episodes are of special interest: (1) a total embargo on oil for Spain in 1940 that was surprisingly successful in dissuading Spain from joining the Axis; (2) a period of reduced supplies in 1941-42 that we call "the Squeeze" that was only partially successful; and (3) a second total embargo in 1944 that was a disappointment for the Allies, given the course of the war, that produced a rift between Churchill and Roosevelt. Our analysis is based on new monthly estimates of Spain's imports of gasoline and other petroleum products, which we describe in the text and report in the appendix. These estimates allow us to draw a clearer picture of the oil sanctions than has been possible in the past.

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Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy: Japanese-U.S. Relations, 1938-1941

Cited by 15 publications

References 1 publication

Beyond Deterrence

Beyond Deterrence

Soft Balancing as Foreign Policy: Assessing American Strategy toward Japan in the Interwar Period

An Elephant in the Garden: The Allies, Spain, and Oil in World War II

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