Beyond Deterrence

Abstract

Part I of this essay reviews cases of deterrence failure and assesses the political, psychological, and practical obstacles to the success of deterrence. The evidence suggests that the utility of deterrence is limited to a narrow range of cases. It is appropriate only when leaders are motivated largely by ' 'opportunity" rather than by "need," have the political freedom to exercise restraint, are not misled by grossly distorted assessments of the political-military situation, and are vulnerable to the kind of threats a deterrer can make. Deterrence must also be practiced early on, before an adversary commits itself to a challenge and becomes correspondingly insensitive to warnings that its action is likely to meet with retaliation. Unless these conditions are met, deterrence will at most be ineffective and at worst counterproductive. Part I1 examines deterrence successes and those cases where deterrence might have succeeded had it been attempted. A case-by-case review makes it apparent that there are few unambiguous examples of the success of deterrence. Inevitably, proponents of deterrence resort to counte$actual reasoning to allege that deterrence would have worked had it been tried. A review of these arguments suggests that they too are frequently open to multiple interpretation. Because the evidence of success is ambiguous and because deterrence can be ineffective, uncertain, and risky, it must be supplemented by other strategies of conflict management. Part III looks beyond deterrence to strategies of "reassurance" that might substitute for or complement deterrence and reduce some of its obvious risks. Strategies of reassurance presume ongoing hostility but, unlike deterrence, root the source of that

Human Development in Adulthood

“…Although, in this instance deterrence would seem to have worked at least to some degree, from a historical viewpoint it has not been especially effective in preventing military conflict (Lebow & Stein, 1987). This was the reasoning in the policy of mutual deterrence practiced by the United States and the Soviet Union for over 40 years following World War 11, a policy that led to a $17 trillion price tag for weapons.…”

Psychological Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence

“…When a problem is described in terms of potential gains, people are risk averse; when it is described in terms of potential losses, people are risk seeking. Kramer 1988) and case studies of actual foreign policy decisions (Lebow & Stein 1987). Kramer 1988) and case studies of actual foreign policy decisions (Lebow & Stein 1987).…”

“…Confronted with two equally unpleasant alternatives, decisionmakers often rely on a coping strat egy known as "defensive avoidance" (Janis & Mann 1977). Similarly, in 1962 Soviet leaders reacted to a strategic problem-the vast American superiority in in tercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)-by placing intermediate-range mis siles in Cuba and then convincing themselves that the United States would accept the fait accompli (Lebow & Stein 1987). In many situations, the first two options are foreclosed and de cisionmakers respond by distorting their perceptions so that they can relieve stress and take action.…”

“…Lebow & Stein (1987;Stein 1990) argue that deterrence was the wrong strategy and needed to be supplemented by "reas surance." Yet the policy failed.…”

“…For instance, Lebow & Stein's (1987) thesis rests on the claim that, in cases where "pure deterrence" failed, a judicious mixture of deterrence and reassurance would have worked. For instance, Lebow & Stein's (1987) thesis rests on the claim that, in cases where "pure deterrence" failed, a judicious mixture of deterrence and reassurance would have worked.…”