In his pioneering essay, “The Element of Decision in the Pattern of of War,” Theodore Abel argues, on the basis of twenty-five sample studies, “The rational, calculating decision for war is reached far in advance of the actual outbreak of hostilities,” and “in no case is the decision precipitated by emotional tensions, sentimentality, crowd behavior, or other irrational motivation. In every case, the decision is based upon a careful weighing of chances and of anticipating consequences.” This thesis—that a state selects an action of war from a number of alternatives in a conscious decision to maximize its goals after a careful weighing of available means and of possible consequences—may be applied as a conceptual scheme which we could term the rational calculation model.
This article explores an action-reaction process which occurred between Japan and the U.S. in the years preceding World War II, focusing on the U.S.' imposition of economic sanctions. It maintains that these sanctions failed to deter the Japanese from pursuing their expansionist policy, and instead stimulated Japan's southward expansion and even its determination to go to war with the U.S. Miscalculations of the deterrent policy are ascribed to lack of understanding of the hard-line faction within the U.S. Govern ment as to the structure of Japan's foreign policy decision-making, and the psychology of the Japanese, in particular the military.
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