In this volume, Richard Ned Lebow introduces his own constructivist theory of political order and international relations based on theories of motives and identity formation drawn from the ancient Greeks. His theory stresses the human need for self-esteem, and shows how it influences political behavior at every level of social aggregation. Lebow develops ideal-type worlds associated with four motives: appetite, spirit, reason and fear, and demonstrates how each generates a different logic concerning cooperation, conflict and risk-taking. Expanding and documenting the utility of his theory in a series of historical case studies, ranging from classical Greece to the war in Iraq, he presents a novel explanation for the rise of the state and the causes of war, and offers a reformulation of prospect theory. This is a novel theory of politics by one of the world's leading scholars of international relations.

Three of the more important international developments of the last half century are the “long peace” between the superpowers, the Soviet Union's renunciation of its empire and leading role as a superpower, and the post-cold war transformation of the international system. Realist theories at the international level address the first and third of these developments, and realist theories at the unit level have made an ex post facto attempt to account for the second. The conceptual and empirical weaknesses of these explanations raise serious problems for existing realist theories. Realists contend that the anarchy of the international system shapes interstate behavior. Postwar international relations indicates that international structure is not determining. Fear of anarchy and its consequences encouraged key international actors to modify their behavior with the avowed goal of changing that structure. The pluralist security community that has developed among the democratic industrial powers is in part the result of this process. This community and the end of the cold war provide evidence that states can escape from the security dilemma.

Deterrence theories purport to supply the auxiliary assumptions rational choice theories need to predict rational strategic behavior. They generally assume that would-be initiators are (i) instrumentally rational; (2) risk-prone gain-maximizers; (3) free of domestic constraints; and (4) able to identify themselves correctly as defenders or challengers. These assumptions are contradicted by empirical studies that indicate that risk-prone, gain-maximizing initiators are relatively uncommon; that leaders at times calculate as deterrence theories expect, but behave contrary to their predictions; and that the calculus of initiators generally depends on factors other than those identified by deterrence theories. Deductive theories of deterrence are also inadequate because they do not define their scope conditions. Nor can they accommodate deviation by initiators from processes of rational calculation. Rational deterrence theories are poorly specified theories about nonexistent decision makers operating in nonexistent environments.

The author contends that the difference between so-called factual and counterfactual arguments is greatly exaggerated; it is one of degree, not of kind. Both arguments ultimately rest on the quality of their assumptions, the chain of logic linking causes to outcomes, and their consistency with available evidence. He critiques two recent historical works that make extensive use of counterfactuals and finds them seriously deficient in method and argument. He then reviews the criteria for counterfactual experimentation proposed by social scientists who have addressed this problem and finds many of their criteria unrealistic and overly restrictive. The methods of counterfactual experimentation need to be commensurate with the purposes for which it is used. The author discusses three uses for counterfactual arguments and thought experiments and proposes eight criteria appropriate to plausible-world counterfactuals.

Is it possible to preserve national security through ethical policies? Richard Ned Lebow seeks to show that ethics are actually essential to the national interest. Recapturing the wisdom of classical realism through a close reading of the texts of Thucydides, Clausewitz and Hans Morgenthau, Lebow argues that, unlike many modern realists, classic realists saw close links between domestic and international politics, and between interests and ethics. Lebow uses this analysis to offer a powerful critique of post-Cold War American foreign policy. He also develops an ontological foundation for ethics and makes the case for an alternate ontology for social science based on Greek tragedy's understanding of life and politics. This is a topical and accessible book, written by a leading scholar in the field.

We report a series of studies of historical reasoning among professional observers of world politics. The correlational studies demonstrate that experts with strong theoretical commitments to a covering law and cognitive-stylistic preferences for explanatory closure are more likely to reject close-call Counterfactual that imply that “already explained” historical outcomes could easily have taken radically different forms. The experimental studies suggest that counterfactual reasoning is not totally theory-driven: Many experts are capable of surprising themselves when encouraged to imagine the implications of particular what-if scenarios. Yet, there is a downside to openness to historical contingency. The more effort experts allocate to exploring counterfactual worlds, the greater is the risk that they will assign too much subjective probability to too many scenarios. We close by defining good judgment as a reflective-equilibrium process of balancing the conflicting causal intuitions primed by complementary factual and counterfactual posings of historical questions.

Part I of this essay reviews cases of deterrence failure and assesses the political, psychological, and practical obstacles to the success of deterrence. The evidence suggests that the utility of deterrence is limited to a narrow range of cases. It is appropriate only when leaders are motivated largely by ' 'opportunity" rather than by "need," have the political freedom to exercise restraint, are not misled by grossly distorted assessments of the political-military situation, and are vulnerable to the kind of threats a deterrer can make. Deterrence must also be practiced early on, before an adversary commits itself to a challenge and becomes correspondingly insensitive to warnings that its action is likely to meet with retaliation. Unless these conditions are met, deterrence will at most be ineffective and at worst counterproductive. Part I1 examines deterrence successes and those cases where deterrence might have succeeded had it been attempted. A case-by-case review makes it apparent that there are few unambiguous examples of the success of deterrence. Inevitably, proponents of deterrence resort to counte$actual reasoning to allege that deterrence would have worked had it been tried. A review of these arguments suggests that they too are frequently open to multiple interpretation. Because the evidence of success is ambiguous and because deterrence can be ineffective, uncertain, and risky, it must be supplemented by other strategies of conflict management. Part III looks beyond deterrence to strategies of "reassurance" that might substitute for or complement deterrence and reduce some of its obvious risks. Strategies of reassurance presume ongoing hostility but, unlike deterrence, root the source of that

Empirical analyses of deterrence have paid insufficient attention to the validity and reliability of the data used to test the central propositions of theories of deterrence. This article examines two prominent studies of immediate extended deterrence that do not deal adequately with the problems inherent in constructing a valid data set for quantitative analysis. The problems are particularly acute in the testing of theories of deterrence because of the difficulties in identifying cases of deterrence success and of inferring the intentions of would-be challengers. Our analysis explores these problems and suggests ways of testing theories of deterrence that can reduce the threats to valid inference.