Making Sense of Corruption

Abstract

Corruption is a serious threat to prosperity, democracy and human well-being, with mounting empirical evidence highlighting its detrimental effects on society. Yet defining this threat has resulted in profound disagreement, producing a multidimensional concept. Tackling this important and provocative topic, the authors provide an accessible and systematic analysis of how our understanding of corruption has evolved. They identify gaps in the research and make connections between related concepts such as clientelism, patronage, patrimonialism, particularism and state capture. A fundamental issue discussed is how the opposite of corruption should be defined. By arguing for the possibility of a universal understanding of corruption, and specifically what corruption is not, an innovative solution to this problem is presented. This book provides an accessible overview of corruption, allowing scholars and students alike to see the far reaching place it has within academic research.

Grappling with the “real politics” of systemic corruption: Theoretical debates versus “real‐world” functions

“…Some authors (e.g., Bauhr & Nasiritousi, ; Mungiu‐Pippidi, ; Persson et al, ; Rothstein, ; Rothstein & Teorell, ; Rothstein & Varriach, ) have recently criticized the principal–agent view within anticorruption policy, as well as governance more generally (Booth & Cammack, ), on the grounds that corruption should instead be viewed as a problem of collective action, especially in contexts of systemic corruption. For example, Mungiu‐Pippidi (, p. xiv) claims that “what is presented in most anticorruption literature as a principal–agent problem is in fact a collective action problem.” From this perspective, viewing corruption as a principal–agent problem “mischaracterizes” the issue of corruption completely (see Persson et al, , for this particular turn of phrase).…”

“…This application emphasizes the rational choices that take place in individual incidents of corruption, implicitly assuming that corruption is “solvable” with policies that can alter these individual calculations. Recently, critics have argued that this assumption is flawed, especially in systemically corrupt contexts, where corruption is best understood to be a collective action problem instead (Bauhr & Nasiritousi, ; Marquette, Pavarala, & Malik, ; Mungiu‐Pippidi, ; Persson et al, ; Rothstein, ; Rothstein & Teorell, ; Rothstein & Varriach, ; Teorell & Rothstein, ). From this critical perspective, it is argued that the application of principal–agent theory mistakenly assumes that there will be “principled principals” in civil society and in positions of power to actively oppose corruption and enforce anticorruption reforms.…”

Getting the basic nature of systemic corruption right: A reply to Marquette and Peiffer

“…Afrobarometer Data, ; Heidenheimer, ; Karklins, ). Instead, corruption seems to primarily resemble a collective action problem (see Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, ; Mungiu‐Pippidi, ; Rothstein & Varraich, ).…”

Exclusion or interests? Why females in elected office reduce petty and grand corruption

“…See Bauhr () for the distinction between need and greed corruption. See also Heidenheimer (), Johnston (, ) and Rothstein and Varraich () for discussions of different forms of corruption.…”