The recent growth in research on "good governance" and the quality of government institutions has been propelled by empirical findings that show that such institutions may hold the key to understanding economic growth and social welfare in developing and transition countries. We argue, however, that a key issue has not been addressed, namely, what quality of government (QoG) actually means at the conceptual level. Based on analyses of political theory, we propose a more coherent and specific definition of QoG: the impartiality of institutions that exercise government authority. We relate the idea of impartiality to a series of criticisms stemming from the fields of public administration, public choice, multiculturalism, and feminism. To place the theory of impartiality in a larger context, we then contrast its scope and meaning with that of a threefold set of competing concepts of quality of government: democracy, the rule of law, and efficiency/effectiveness.

With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda—two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries—we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal–agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so‐called principals for granted.

What conditions provide fertile soil for democratic advancement?Are some nations endowed with traits conducive to democratization while others are doomed to a cycle of authoritarianism? These questions have been at the heart of a fifty-year quest to determine the basic preconditions for democracy. Modernization theorists have asserted the primacy of socioeconomic development while others have identified culture and religion, diversity, oil and natural resources, and diffusion effects as factors that might advance or hinder a country's prospects for democratic change. Our understanding of democratization is, however, far from complete.Unlike the majority of past studies, which assume that all nondemocratic nations face similar obstacles to democratization, we explore here institutional requisites for democracy. Are certain authoritarian regimes more likely to break down and, if so, are certain types more likely to democratize? Do the institutional attributes of the authoritarian regime affect a country's prospects for democratic transition?To answer these questions we develop a new typology of authoritarian regimes-based on Barbara Geddes's seminal contribution 1 -covering 191 countries in the world from 1972 to 2003. Our results show that different types of authoritarianism have different propensities for survival and for democratization. Hence an institutional attribute-the

In the wake of the Cold War, democracy has gained the status of a mantra. Yet there is no consensus about how to conceptualize and measure regimes such that meaningful comparisons can be made through time and across countries. In this prescriptive article, we argue for a new approach to conceptualization and measurement. We first review some of the weaknesses among traditional approaches. We then lay out our approach, which may be characterized ashistorical,multidimensional,disaggregated,andtransparent.We end by reviewing some of the payoffs such an approach might bring to the study of democracy.

Abstract.  This article proposes an agenda for political participation research aimed at providing empirical answers to questions derived from normative political theory. Based on a threefold distinction between responsive, participatory and deliberative models of democracy, the article first distinguishes three conceptions of political participation: as influencing attempts, as direct decision making, and as political discussion. Second, it is argued that each of the three models is associated with different desired consequences of political participation: equal protection of interests, self‐development and subjective legitimacy. Third, a procedural standard is identified from which to evaluate the mechanism generating the three types of participation. By analogy with theories of distributive justice, this mechanism should be sensitive to incentives but insensitive to resources. The empirical questions thus implied are finally drawn together into an integrated agenda for future participation studies.