A growing body of research argues that anticorruption efforts fail because of a flawed theoretical foundation, where collective action theory is said to be a better lens for understanding corruption than the dominant principal–agent theory. We unpack this critique and advance several new arguments. First, the application of collective action theory to the issue of corruption has been, thus far, incomplete. Second, a collective action theory‐based approach to corruption is in fact complementary to a principal–agent approach, rather than contradictory as is claimed. Third, applications of both theories have failed to recognize that corruption persists because it functions to provide solutions to problems. We conclude by arguing that anticorruption effectiveness is difficult to achieve because it requires insights from all three perspectives—principal–agent theory, collective action theory, and corruption as serving functions—which allows us to better understand how to harness the political will needed to fight corruption.

General rightsThis document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:

General rightsThis document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms Who will be the 'Principled-Principals'? How Perceptions of Corruption Influence Willingness to Engage in Anticorruption Civic Action Caryn Peiffer Linda AlvarezNote: This is the pre-published manuscript for: Peiffer & Alvarez (2016) 'Who will be the Principled Principals? Examining willingness to actively oppose corruption' Governance Volume 29, Issue 3, pp 351-369. The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version Abstract Many anti-corruption campaigns aim to encourage citizens to demand better control over corruption. Recent literature suggests that perceived high levels of corruption and government effectiveness in controlling corruption will limit citizens' willingness to actively oppose corruption. Using Transparency International's 2013 Global Corruption Barometer we test these ideas across a 71 country sample. We find that perceived government effectiveness tends to encourage anticorruption action, while perceptions of corruption being widespread tend to have the opposite impact in non-OECD countries. Our analyses also suggest that the interaction between these perceptions are important; we find that especially among those who perceive that the level of corruption is high, when confidence in the government's efforts grows so does their willingness fight corruption. 2Over the last fifteen years, the effort and investment poured into fighting corruption in the developing world has grown seemingly exponentially (see Michael and Bowser, 2009:1), and the focus of donor supported anticorruption initiatives has arguably broadened, as well (Johnson, Taxell & Zaum, 2012;Schmidt 2007). Along with targeting the 'supply' of corruption, through the support of reforms that promise to ensure greater government transparency, a reduction in civil servants' discretion over resources, and harsher punishments for corrupt transgressions (Agarwal and Van Wicklin III, 2012;Shah 2007), it is now the norm that anti-corruption initiatives also tackle the "demand-side" too. Demand-side initiatives share in common the goals of widening the socio-political space available for citizens to demand better control over corruption and empowering citizens' groups to do so (Chene, 2008;Schmidt 2007;McNeil and Malena 2010). The logic behind these types of initiatives is rooted in the assumption that where political commitment to reform is lacking, "the demands and protests emanating from civil society can induce reluctant political leaders to conduct anti-corruption purges" (William 2000: xvi).However, as several have noted, programs that simply facilitate an opening in the socio-political space available for citizens to voice their grievances or participate in government decision-making ...

The few studies that have examined the systematic determinants of HIV/AIDS policy cross-nationally have left the possible impact of foreign aid out of the equation. At a time when developed nations are critically reassessing their foreign aid commitments a deeper understanding of the impact of HIV/AIDS foreign aid on policy outcomes in the developing world is vital. This study expands the present literature by analyzing the role of foreign funding in a nation's response to the epidemic. The authors find that while HIV/AIDS directed foreign aid has significantly positive effects on a country's treatment coverage rates, the level of traditionalism is a more important influence with regard to the proclivity of a country to adopt preventative policies centred on HIV/AIDS education. Civil and political rights are critical, but not often the real problem for the destitute sick. My patients in Haiti can now vote but they can't get medical care or clean water. (Paul Farmer)

Awareness-raising messages feature prominently in most anticorruption strategies. Yet, there has been limited systematic research into their efficacy. There is growing concern that anticorruption awareness-raising efforts may be backfiring; instead of encouraging citizens to resist corruption, they may be nudging them to “go with the corrupt grain.” This study offers a first test of the effect of anticorruption messaging on ordinary people’s behavior. A household-level field experiment, conducted with a representative sample in Lagos, Nigeria, is used to test whether exposure to five different messages about (anti)corruption influence the outcome of a “bribery game.” We find that exposure to anticorruption messages largely fails to discourage the decision to bribe, and in some cases it makes individuals more willing to pay a bribe. Importantly, we also find that the effect of anticorruption messaging is conditioned by an individual’s preexisting perceptions regarding the prevalence of corruption.