Logical Pluralism

Beall, Jc; Restall, Greg

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199288403.001.0001

Cited by 157 publications

(222 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…Taking dialetheism seriously entails admitting true contradictions, which subsequently entails accepting a dialetheic logic. Now, of course, the dialetheist might choose to not reject classical logic while accepting a dialetheic logic, for she may be a logical pluralist [7], however it is not accurate to say that taking dialetheism seriously entails not rejecting classical logic. Unless one is a logical pluralist, given that classical logic does not allow for true contradictions it seems obvious that the dialetheist is obliged to reject classical logic, just as the classical logician is obliged to reject a dialetheic logic.…”

Section: Tkaczyk On the Deficiency Of Dialetheic Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

In Defence of Dialetheism: A Reply to Beziau and Tkaczyk

Martin

2017

LLP

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Abstract. In recent editions of this journal, Jean-Yves Beziau [8] and Marcin Tkaczyk [42] have criticised a prominent dialetheic logic and common arguments for dialetheism, respectively. While Beziau argues that Priest's logic LP commits the dialetheist to trivialism, the thesis that all propositions are true, Tkaczyk maintains that the arguments traditionally proposed for dialetheism are faulty and ultimately that dialetheism should be rejected as self-refuting. This paper shows that both are mistaken in their contentions. Beziau's argument conflates truth-in-an-interpretation with truth simpliciter and Tkaczyk misconstrues the substance of dialetheic arguments. In the process of identifying these weaknesses of both arguments, the paper clarifies elements of both dialetheic logics and dialetheism which these discussions demonstrate are still misunderstood within the literature.

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Section: Tkaczyk On the Deficiency Of Dialetheic Argumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

In Defence of Dialetheism: A Reply to Beziau and Tkaczyk

Martin

2017

LLP

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“…4 The point of the present paper is to examine the freedom that the distinction between truth conditions and information conditions gives us. Although truth and information are closely connected, I claim that when we distinguish between truth conditions and information conditions (and associate logical validity with the former) we gain a lot of freedom to adopt a theory of truth that is relatively independent of our logical theory.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 The suggestion of the link between relevant logic and situation semantics was …rst made by John Perry (in Barwise and Perry (1985)) (and in conversation with me in 1992) and Jon Barwise (1993). Their ideas have been developed in Greg Restall (1996), Beall and Restall (2006) and Mares (1996), (2004). 3 Quoted in Seligman and Moss (1997) page 288.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Information, Negation, and Paraconsistency

Mares

2012

Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications

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This paper begins by arguing that a truth conditional approach to the semantics for relevant logic is unnatural. Rather, we should adopt an informational semantics. On this view, the indices in the RoutleyMeyer semantics are situations, which can be said either to contain or not contain, particular pieces of information. Valid inference, then, is seen as information preservation, not truth preservation. The distinction between truth and information gives us some freedom in our treatment of logic. For example, we may have a very classical theory of truth but a very non-clasisical theory of information. On the other hand, we may accept very non-classical theories of truth (such as dialetheism) together with an informational treatment of logic.

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“…Mortensen defends both views, but possibilism does not necessarily pose the problem for logical monism I will discuss below, so I will speak exclusively in terms of non-necessitarianism. 2 The non-necessitarianist thesis seems to be innocuous for logical pluralism: The latter only would say that logic is not in the business of inferences holding in all situations, but rather in inferences holding in all situations of a certain kind. However, possibilism and non-necessitarianism seem so outrageous that even pluralists of the sort just described reject them, cf.…”

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confidence: 99%

On the Meaning of Connectives (Apropos of a Non-Necessitarianist Challenge)

Estrada-González

2011

Log. Univers.

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Abstract. According to logical non-necessitarianism, every inference may fail in some situation. In his defense of logical monism, Graham Priest has put forward an argument against non-necessitarianism based on the meaning of connectives. According to him, as long as the meanings of connectives are fixed, some inferences have to hold in all situations. Hence, in order to accept the non-necessitarianist thesis one would have to dispose arbitrarily of those meanings. I want to show here that non-necessitarianism can stand, without disposing arbitrarily of the meanings of connectives, based on a minimalist view on the meanings of connectives.Mathematics Subject Classification (2010). Primary 03A05.

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Logical Pluralism

Cited by 157 publications

References 64 publications

In Defence of Dialetheism: A Reply to Beziau and Tkaczyk

In Defence of Dialetheism: A Reply to Beziau and Tkaczyk

Information, Negation, and Paraconsistency

On the Meaning of Connectives (Apropos of a Non-Necessitarianist Challenge)

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