In Defence of Dialetheism: A Reply to Beziau and Tkaczyk

Martin, Ben R.

doi:10.12775/llp.2017.030

Cited by 6 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…19). However, in this case too, the clauses for the Boolean connectives in the dialetheist's logic are expected to match those of classical logic, with the dialetheist's logic diverging from classical logic in allowing for truth-value gluts (see Martin 2018). look like (see, for example , Priest 2006b;Beall 2009); but, all agree that (Dvi) is a desideratum for their logic.…”

Section: A Case Study: the Dialetheism Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying logical evidence

Martin

2020

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Given the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it’s understandable that there has been a marked increase in interest in logical epistemology within the literature. If we are to choose between these logical theories, we require a good understanding of the suitable criteria we ought to judge according to. However, so far there’s been a lack of appreciation of how logical practice could support an epistemology of logic. This paper aims to correct that error, by arguing for a practice-based approach to logical epistemology. By looking at the types of evidence logicians actually appeal to in attempting to support their theories, we can provide a more detailed and realistic picture of logical epistemology. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of a practice-based approach, we look to a particular case of logical argumentation—the dialetheist’s arguments based upon the self-referential paradoxes—and show that the evidence appealed to support a particular theory of logical epistemology, logical abductivism.

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Section: A Case Study: the Dialetheism Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying logical evidence

Martin

2020

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“…The first studies on PL were developed in 1958, when hierarchical systems were proposed. In 1987, the annotated logic was developed to provide a basis for PL programming, which evolved into PAL, a more robust PL for practical application in decision-making processes [25,[42][43][44][45].…”

Section: Paraconsistent Annotated Logic (Pal)mentioning

confidence: 99%

PAL-VMEA: A Novel Method for Enhancing Decision-Making Consistency in Maintenance Management

et al. 2020

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Decision-making regarding maintenance planning has become increasingly critical. In view of the need for more assertive decisions, methods, and tools based on failure analysis, performance indicators, and risk analysis have obtained great visibility. One of these methods, the Variation and Mode Effect Analysis (VMEA), is a statistically based method that analyses the effect of different sources of variations on a system. One great advantage of VMEA is to facilitate the understanding of these variations and to highlight the system areas in which improvement efforts should be directed. However, like many knowledge-based methods, the inherent epistemic uncertainty can be propagated to its result, influencing following decisions. To minimize this issue, this work proposes the novel combination of VMEA with Paraconsistent Annotated Logic (PAL), a technique that withdraws the principle of noncontradiction, allowing better decision-making when contradictory opinions are present. To demonstrate the method applicability, a case study analyzing a hydrogenerator components is presented. Results show how the proposed method is capable of indicating which are the failure modes that most affect the analyzed system, as well as which variables must be monitored so that the symptoms related to each failure mode can be observed, helping in decision-making regarding maintenance planning.

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“…They must endorse a different logic, one appropriate to their own commitments. These logics have three essential properties (Martin 2018), being: Dialetheic: A logic L is dialetheic iff L permits contradictions, formally conceived as formulae of the form A  ¬A, to be true in an interpretation.…”

Section: The Dialetheism Debatementioning

confidence: 99%

Searching for Deep Disagreement in Logic: The Case of Dialetheism

Martin

2019

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According to Fogelin's account of deep disagreements, disputes caused by a clash in framework propositions are necessarily rationally irresolvable. Fogelin's thesis is a claim about real-life, and not purely hypothetical, arguments: there are such disagreements, and they are incapable of rational resolution. Surprisingly then, few attempts have been made to find such disputes in order to test Fogelin's thesis. This paper aims to rectify that failure. Firstly, it clarifies Fogelin's concept of deep disagreement and shows there are several different breeds of such disagreements. Thus, to fully assess Fogelin's thesis, it will be necessary to seek out cases of each breed to evaluate their rational irresolvability. Secondly, it begins this task by looking at a significant debate within the logical literature over the truth of contradictions. We demonstrate that, while the debate exemplifies a breed of deep disagreement, the parties involved can supply one another with rationally compelling reasons. Keywords Deep disagreements • Fogelin • framework propositions • logical disputes • dialetheism • contradictions 1 Introduction: Deep Disagreement and LogicThere are deep disagreements, and they are immune to rational resolution. These are the two main claims of Fogelin's "The Logic of Deep Disagreement":Deep Disagreement: There exist deep disagreements.Rational Resistance: All deep disagreements are rationally irresolvable.Neither thesis entails the other. One could admit that while there exist deep disagreements, at least some of them are capable of rational resolution, thereby accepting Deep Disagreement while rejecting Rational Resistance. Inversely, one could deny there are any deep disagreements while admitting that if there were any then indeed they would be rationally irresolvable. Both theses, then, require independent justification.Given that Fogelin endorses both, we are faced with answering two questions:• Are there any deep disagreements?• Are these disagreements always immune to rational resolution?Fogelin's thesis is not intended as a conceptual truth about the rational immunity of a purely hypothetical breed of argument. Rather, his claim is that certain real-world disagreements, such

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In Defence of Dialetheism: A Reply to Beziau and Tkaczyk

Cited by 6 publications

References 27 publications

Identifying logical evidence

Identifying logical evidence

PAL-VMEA: A Novel Method for Enhancing Decision-Making Consistency in Maintenance Management

Searching for Deep Disagreement in Logic: The Case of Dialetheism

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