According to Fogelin's account of deep disagreements, disputes caused by a clash in framework propositions are necessarily rationally irresolvable. Fogelin's thesis is a claim about real-life, and not purely hypothetical, arguments: there are such disagreements, and they are incapable of rational resolution. Surprisingly then, few attempts have been made to find such disputes in order to test Fogelin's thesis. This paper aims to rectify that failure. Firstly, it clarifies Fogelin's concept of deep disagreement and shows there are several different breeds of such disagreements. Thus, to fully assess Fogelin's thesis, it will be necessary to seek out cases of each breed to evaluate their rational irresolvability. Secondly, it begins this task by looking at a significant debate within the logical literature over the truth of contradictions. We demonstrate that, while the debate exemplifies a breed of deep disagreement, the parties involved can supply one another with rationally compelling reasons.
Keywords Deep disagreements • Fogelin • framework propositions • logical disputes • dialetheism • contradictions 1 Introduction: Deep Disagreement and LogicThere are deep disagreements, and they are immune to rational resolution. These are the two main claims of Fogelin's "The Logic of Deep Disagreement":Deep Disagreement: There exist deep disagreements.Rational Resistance: All deep disagreements are rationally irresolvable.Neither thesis entails the other. One could admit that while there exist deep disagreements, at least some of them are capable of rational resolution, thereby accepting Deep Disagreement while rejecting Rational Resistance. Inversely, one could deny there are any deep disagreements while admitting that if there were any then indeed they would be rationally irresolvable. Both theses, then, require independent justification.Given that Fogelin endorses both, we are faced with answering two questions:• Are there any deep disagreements?• Are these disagreements always immune to rational resolution?Fogelin's thesis is not intended as a conceptual truth about the rational immunity of a purely hypothetical breed of argument. Rather, his claim is that certain real-world disagreements, such