Identifying logical evidence

Martin, Ben

doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02618-y

Cited by 21 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 53 publications

(45 reference statements)

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“…Therefore, neither relying upon those rules sanctioned by the theory T in order to test it, nor those rules rejected by the theory, seem viable, and consequently there is no way to reliably test a logical theory. This is known as the background logic (or, centrality problem) [57,66,68], and impacts any account of logical methodology which proposes that we come to be justified in believing a logical theory by appealing to some putative non-immediate evidence, including logical abductivism [36,66]. For, under such a methodology, we will always need to appeal to rules of inference in order to substantiate the claim that the available evidence is (in)consistent with the relevant logical theory.…”

Section: Upshot 3: the Background Logic Problem As Was Highlighted Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logical Predictivism

Martin

Hjortland

2020

J Philos Logic

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Motivated by weaknesses with traditional accounts of logical epistemology, considerable attention has been paid recently to the view, known as anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), that the subject matter and epistemology of logic may not be so different from that of the recognised sciences. One of the most prevalent claims made by advocates of AEL is that theory choice within logic is significantly similar to that within the sciences. This connection with scientific methodology highlights a considerable challenge for the anti-exceptionalist, as two uncontentious claims about scientific theories are that they attempt to explain a target phenomenon and (at least partially) prove their worth through successful predictions. Thus, if this methodological AEL is to be viable, the anti-exceptionalist will need a reasonable account of what phenomena logics are attempting to explain, how they can explain, and in what sense they can be said to issue predictions. This paper makes sense of the anti-exceptionalist proposal with a new account of logical theory choice, logical predictivism, according to which logics are engaged in both a process of prediction and explanation.

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Section: Upshot 3: the Background Logic Problem As Was Highlighted Inmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logical Predictivism

Martin

Hjortland

2020

J Philos Logic

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“…Studies of contemporary practice show that logicians are more liberal in their interpretation of logical evidence. For example, Hjortland and Martin (Hjortland 2017, 644;Hjortland 2019;Martin 2020) list theories of truth, mathematical theories and practice, quantum physics, psychology of reasoning, epistemic norms of rationality, vagueness, semantic paradoxes and set theory, in addition to empirical findings, and natural-language use. Interestingly, Hjortland mentions psychology of reasoning in (Hjortland 2017, 644), but it is not listed in (Martin and Hjortland 2021).…”

Section: Introduction: Logic and Psychologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hjortland (2019, 255) holds that it is better to distinguish logic from reasoning; he also advocates a typical division of labour, according to which psychology is appropriate for investigating how we reason while the validity of inferences is the subject matter of logical theories. Martin (Martin 2020), on the other hand, derives what constitutes logical evidence from the practice of logicians.…”

Section: Introduction: Logic and Psychologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A more differentiated critique of psychologism is advocated, discerning between justified criticism levelled at plump cases of untenable psychologism and unjustified criticism that has stifled research. (Jacquette 1997;Jacquette 2001;Jacquette 2003b) Learning from actual practice through historical case studies in mathematics and the natural sciences has proven its worth in the philosophy of science, and this method is equally well justified in logic (Martin 2020). There are nevertheless limits to what can be learnt from practice.…”

Section: Introduction: Logic and Psychologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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A psychological theory of reasoning as logical evidence: a Piagetian perspective

Winstanley

2021

Synthese

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Many contemporary logicians acknowledge a plurality of logical theories and accept that theory choice is in part motivated by logical evidence. However, just as there is no agreement on logical theories, there is also no consensus on what constitutes logical evidence. In this paper, I outline Jean Piaget's psychological theory of reasoning and show how he used it to diagnose and solve one of the paradoxes of material implication. I assess Piaget's use of psychology as a source of evidence for logical theory in light of reservations raised by psychologism, and I highlight some ramifications for exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism about logic by considering his use of psychology as logical evidence in the framework of genetic epistemology, Piaget's research programme. I conclude that Piaget's psychological theory of reasoning not only plausibly serves as a source of evidence for logical theory but also makes a strong case for anti-exceptionalism about logic.

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“…This abductive version of anti-exceptionalism is opposed to other two epistemologies of logic: rationalism (Bealer, 1998) 1 , which holds that we learn logic by rational insight, and semanticism (Boghossian, 2000), according to which we learn logic by understanding the meaning of logical expressions. 2 In a recent paper, Martin and Hjortland (2020) identify antiexceptionalism with the more general idea that logic has a scientific methodology: Methodological Anti-Exceptionalism means that "Theory choice within logic is similar in important respects to that of the recognized sciences" (p. 2). Logical abductivism is one version of this idea (p. 2, fn.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logic as a Puzzle-Solving Activity

Tajer

2021

Anál. Filos.

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Some authors have recently argued in favor of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The general idea is that logic is not different from the other sciences, and its principles are as revisable as scientific principles. This paper has three sections. In section 1, I discuss the meaning of anti-exceptionalism and its place in contemporary logic. In section 2, I analyze some recent developments on this topic by Williamson (2017) and Hjortland (2017), which will motivate my view. In section 3, I propose a puzzle-solving perspective on logical practice. According to my view, there is a common methodology, in which scientists may use non-classical in order to solve some specific puzzles, but classical logic stays in a privileged position, as a common language and as a general theory of reasoning. This role cannot be fulfilled by other logics, and therefore the comparison between classical and non-classical logic is not like a regular comparison between competing hypotheses in science. The methodology of logical practice is therefore not abductive, at least in many important cases. Classical logic is not the “best available theory”, but the fundamental piece of our scientific methodology. My position is still anti-exceptionalist: logic is like any other science, or at least like any other science which can be characterized by a puzzle-solving methodology.

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Identifying logical evidence

Cited by 21 publications

References 53 publications

Logical Predictivism

Logical Predictivism

A psychological theory of reasoning as logical evidence: a Piagetian perspective

Logic as a Puzzle-Solving Activity

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