Information, Negation, and Paraconsistency

Abstract

This paper begins by arguing that a truth conditional approach to the semantics for relevant logic is unnatural. Rather, we should adopt an informational semantics. On this view, the indices in the RoutleyMeyer semantics are situations, which can be said either to contain or not contain, particular pieces of information. Valid inference, then, is seen as information preservation, not truth preservation. The distinction between truth and information gives us some freedom in our treatment of logic. For example, we may have a very classical theory of truth but a very non-clasisical theory of information. On the other hand, we may accept very non-classical theories of truth (such as dialetheism) together with an informational treatment of logic.

Informational Semantics as a Third Alternative?

“…This means that abstract situations can be part of the world if they contain information about a concrete situation (or several such situations) in that world. In fact, resisting the adoption of a non-classical truththeory is a good way to avoid a dialetheic interpretation of inconsistent situations (Mares 2008).…”